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PREFACE

The *Military Chaplains' Review* is designed as a medium in which those interested in the military chaplaincy can share with chaplains the product of their experience and research. We welcome articles which are directly concerned with supporting and strengthening chaplains professionally. Preference will be given to those articles having lasting value as reference material.

The Military Chaplains' Review is published quarterly. The opinions reflected in each article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Chief of Chaplains or the Department of the Army.

Articles should be submitted in duplicate, double spaced, to the Editor, Military Chaplains' Review, United States Army Chaplain Board, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755. Articles should be approximately 10 to 20 pages in length and, when appropriate, should be carefully footnoted.

IN THIS ISSUE

Four of the five articles appearing in this issue of the REVIEW originally were presented at a conference at the US Army Chaplain Board. The purpose of that conference was to examine the philosophical foundations of ethics and its practical application in value education. The remaining paper, by Dr. Roger Shinn, was given at the Command Chaplains Conference and was an occasion for addressing some of the most influential leaders of the military community on the ethical aspects of command. Taken together, they represent serious efforts to examine the moral and ethical dilemmas which we face in a complex, modern society.

Our nation currently is preoccupied with ethical issues. Perhaps there was an earlier time in our history when life was simpler, and a clergyman could speak with clarity, if not with certainty, on the topics most likely to raise controversy. But modern society is complex; old assumptions are re-examined as men seek to measure their integrity with standards which often are conflicting, and which compete for their loyalties. The quest for guidelines by which all can attain the good life requires our best efforts, and it must be a joint effort. The process itself teaches that truth is a collective responsibility and justice is a function of mutual accountability.

I commend this issue to you as a real help in clarifying the way we ought to approach these issues.

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Chief of Chaplains

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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MILITARY CHAPLAINS' REVIEW

Articles Page

Some Traditional Approaches to Moral Theory
Dr. David Little ---------- 1

Ethical Theory and Value Education
Dr. Theodore R. Weber ---------- 17

On Theoretical Egocentrism and the Problem of Compliance
Dr. Robert Hogan ---------- 38

The Life Good to Live: A Psycho-Ethical Perspective
Dr. Peter A. Bertocci ---------- 47

Ethical Aspects of the Exercise of Command
Dr. Roger L. Shinn ---------- 67

Bibliography ---------- 77

SOME TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO MORAL THEORY

David Little, Ph. D.

My task, as I understand it, is to show how certain traditional philosophical positions have identified and illuminated what ordinary people are doing when they think about morality and when they try to make moral decisions. I shall choose for analysis those positions which, to my mind, have caught hold of some enduring feature or features of moral decision-making—enduring from the point of view of persons living in modern industrial societies, with whom the Army is most likely to deal. I shall both examine and evaluate these positions, suggesting their deficiencies, as well as what it is about them that is "most likely to retain more than ephemeral usefulness" (in the words of the outline describing the paper topics).

It is assumed in this paper that moral instruction consists, in part at least, in helping people to learn to participate consciously and competently in moral discussion and in moral reflection about their own and other people's behavior. Of course people frequently do these things, but they are not always fully aware of what they are doing, nor do they always have full understanding of "the rules of the game" that implicitly guide conversations and reflection in the moral area.

One way to get a feel for these rules, and to begin to develop competence in moral discussion and deliberation, is to observe prominent figures in the field. To see how they argue, what issues concern them, how they resolve difficulties that are thrown up to them—such observation is, I believe, a central part of moral instruction. In this paper I have chosen three moralists who are very prominent in the tradition, figures who have exerted and continue to exert considerable influence on the way people think about morals. In many ways, their arguments are paradigms of arguments one still hears all the time. It may thus be of value to watch them in action.

But before we turn to expositing and evaluating the moral theoretical positions themselves, it is important to try to get clear on what we mean by the words "moral" and "morality." Certainly too much time can be spent on definitional matters,

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yet experience informs me that it is worthwhile making people self-conscious of the way they use these slippery terms. My following proposal is not intended to legislate a meaning for our conversations, but rather to show how one's understanding of morality can set the guidelines according to which an analysis of moral decision-making can proceed.

A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF MORALITY

I take a "moral statement" to be a "statement expressing the acceptance of an action-guide, which claims superiority, and which is considered legitimate, in that it is justifiable and other-regarding." [1] Correspondingly, a "morality" is a "system" of action-guides applying to a wide range of human activity, which system conforms to the above conditions governing a moral statement. The notion of "action-guide" is important in that it points to the fact that morality is basically a *practical* affair. It has to do with constraining and prescribing action, as well as attitudes towards action. More specifically, it regulates who may do what to whom, under what circumstances. Next, by a moral action-guide's claiming "superiority," I mean that moral utterances invariably occupy a "weighty" position in discourse; they are, as the youth culture has it, "heavy." That does not mean that moral action-guides always determine every practical decision: "I know I ought not to have lied about my health, but I just didn't want to play tennis with that duffer," is the sort of common statement revealing both that moral utterances are weighty, but also that they do not always win out over our inclinations. In short, moral action-guides are superior, but are not always overriding.

The terms that are employed to express moral beliefs—including words like "right/wrong," "good/bad," "ought/ought not," "obligation," "duty," etc.—are "legitimacy words," which means that they invite authentication. It is too heady a problem for us to go into here as to why human beings normally try to root their moral prescriptions in some set of objective conditions beyond their immediate inclinations. Suffice it to say that there is such a proclivity which has, as our definition makes clear, two dimensions, justifiability and other-regardingness.

First, the "thirst to justify," which occupies such a central place in moral discourse, involves several logical features worth noting. To justify or to give reasons in support of a particular moral action-guide, like "You oughtn't to lie," is to have to pass

[1] This definition of morality is developed further in an essay by David Little and S. B. Twiss, Jr., "Basic Terms in the Study of Religious Ethics," *Religion and Morality*, edited by J. Reeder and G. Outka (New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1973).

some tests. If, when you ask me why you oughtn't to lie, I tell you that lying will cause large rocks to fall on your head, we would not think much of that justification. The explanation is that the reasons given in support of the action-guide are not *relevant*. As we shall see, several moral positions rely heavily on being able to show that lying, stealing, murdering and the like cause bad consequences to the performer. Obviously, these positions fall to the ground unless they can make their case stick. If they cannot make it stick, then they will be in the same boat I am in when I assert that lying causes large rocks to fall on liars' heads. The first test any justification must pass, then, is that of *relevance*.

Another test that must be passed is that of *consistency*. If I claim that lying is bad, and go around censuring people who lie, and yet I exempt myself from the prescription without any "good reason," you will smell a rat. But not only does the test of consistency dictate that like cases be judged alike, it also dictates, generally speaking, that satisfactory justification proceed in an "appellate" fashion, in such a way that "lower," more specific action-guides can be shown to *derive* consistently (or logically) from higher, more general principles. Thus, assuming one could show, for instance, that lying undermines the fabric of trust on which human cooperation depends, and assuming that human cooperation is considered to be "good," the restriction against lying would seem justified, since the reasons given in support appear to be consistent with one another.

It is worth stressing that an important part of moral reasoning has to do with this appellate pattern of justification, by which an individual attempts, when pressed, to appeal to "higher courts" or to more general principles, until he reaches the "supreme court" of his moral system, or what we shall call his *basic moral prescription*. One central concern we will have in analysing various traditional moral positions is to identify the basic moral prescription of each, and to see how the more specific applications to moral judgments "follow from" it. Incidentally, this process we have just been describing, whereby an individual attempts to give reasons in a consistent fashion for his moral decisions, is called *validation*. It is the more strictly logical side of justification.

There is another part of justification, however, and that we call *vindication*. The process of vindicating comes into play when one tries to provide suggestions or hints as to why the particular basic moral prescription he has adopted is so appealing and ought to be adopted by others. If a Christian, for example, thought of the love commandment as his basic moral prescription from which all his specific moral judgments were to be derived, he

would be vindicating that basic prescription to others when he suggested that by adopting it they would find greater fulfillment or satisfaction or some such. At the level of vindication we are attempting to convert others to whatever particular basic prescription we may be pushing. Again, in our analysis of different positions we will attend to the suggestions or hints offered as persuasive evidence in support of a particular basic prescription. (In more technical terminology, what goes on under the name of vindication is "metaethics," while what goes on under the name of validation is "normative ethics.") A moral action-guide, then, is held to be justifiable insofar as it can pass the tests of relevance and consistency (including the activities of validating and vindicating).

A moral action-guide is "other-regarding" in two senses of the word "regard." In the first sense, the word "moral" applies to a class of acts like 'murder,' 'mayhem,' 'rape,' 'perjury,' 'thievery,' —acts in which the effects of one person's behavior "impinge upon" (or regard) others in a special way. They have a direct and usually dramatic impact upon the existence and welfare of another person(s). As one author puts it, there is a class of human acts (which he calls "moral-species" acts) that "are so significant for human existence and welfare" as necessarily to be the object of moral reflection.

Because the minimal conditions of human survival and welfare are the same the world over, we can understand why there is a relatively fixed range of action-guides that in all societies come to be regarded as "superior" and "legitimate" (according to one or another pattern of justification)—namely, the moral-species terms that rule against indiscriminate cheating, stealing or violence within the ingroup. While a moral code is not exhausted by attention to acts of this sort, and while different moral systems vary in interpreting these acts, they are of basic importance, which is to say they are invariably seen as very weighty, relative to other action-guides. It seems, then, that whatever else it is, "moral reasoning" is indispensably concerned with this fixed range of welfare-oriented acts.

Morality is other-regarding in still a second sense. The word "regard" means not only "impinge upon," but also "to consider" or "to attend to." Thus, in order to have a *moral* position at all, it will be necessary to show that in justifying a particular action-guide, some attention is given to the welfare of others. (The various synonyms we use in English for describing moral dispositions, such as "considerateness" and "thoughtfulness" are indicative at this point.)

This stipulation of other-regardingness (in both senses) is

important in distinguishing moral from nonmoral positions, which is, after all, the point of being careful about definitions. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, was very ambiguous, if not confused, on the matter of whether or not he was proposing a "new morality." But were the following words to represent his consistent position, we could say, on our definition of morality, that Nietzsche was recommending a distinctly *non*moral system. Indeed, that conclusion seems fully in keeping with at least one side of Nietzsche's avowed intentions to move "beyond good and evil" altogether:

> Life itself [says Nietzsche] is *essentially* appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one always use those words in which a slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages?

In other words, the law of life, according to Nietzsche, consists of active *disregard* for the welfare of all others, and that which *is* the true and basic guide to human action ought, if this side of Nietzsche has its way, to become the law of life in practice. To work out a set of action-guides according to this understanding of the true law of human action would be very revolutionary so far as our *concept* of morality is concerned. However, as I say, one part of Nietzsche's own purpose was precisely to effect such a revolution in basic human concepts.

Another example of the utility of this proposed definition of morality in helping to distinguish between moral and nonmoral systems is the case of Theravada Buddhism and other similar mystical points of view. Though there is evidence in Theravada Buddhism of a system of action-guides that conforms to our definition of morality, the ultimate objective of the devout Buddhist is, in attaining Nirvana, to enter a state of "equanimity," or "serene unconcern" so far as the earthly welfare either of oneself or of others goes. In fact, the whole concept of "self" and "other" is dissolved in Nirvana. Consequently, the system of monastic action-guides that characterizes the preferred pattern of activity is finally "transmoral" or "postmoral." Again, this sort of distinction appears to conform exactly to the intentions of archaic Theravada Buddhism. It is my suggestion that all mystical positions drive eventually in this same sort of transmoral direction.

We may conclude from this cursory reference to the transmoral character of mystical systems that to the degree a code of conduct diminishes other-regardingness, it becomes, correspondingly, less and less a "moral" code of conduct. If, for example, in our own Western context, self-regarding virtues like

temperance, physical fitness, aesthetic sensibility, and so on, came systematically to be considered as weightier or more important than the more distinctly other-regarding, welfare-oriented activity, then a new, more or less "postmoral" code of action would be emerging in our society.

AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TRADITIONAL MORAL POSITIONS

1. *The Modified Egoism of Thomas Hobbes.* Hobbes' brand of moral philosophy is of great importance for our purposes because he stands at the beginning of the "modern age" so far as moral and political philosophy are concerned. It was during the 17th century in England, when Hobbes wrote, that the established standards of moral and political life were breaking up. As the result of the deep alterations wrought by the Puritan Revolution, England began—uncertainly, to be sure—to move from what Max Weber called a "traditionalistic" to a "legal rational" pattern of authority, or one based on a theory of individual achievement and rational consent, rather than on tradition and inherited status.

Consequently, Hobbes highlights certain aspects of moral reasoning that are still with us, especially the importance of rational self-interest as a starting-point for moral reflection. Indeed, in his belief that self-interest is what, after all, underlies all human motivation, Hobbes continues to attract a following, perhaps a greater one than we like to admit.

But can Hobbes' egoism be classed as a moral philosophy at all, according to our definition? It is clear he is concerned with action-guides and with all of our "legitimacy words," like good/bad, right/wrong, as they apply to action, as well as with duty, obligation, etc. Moreover, he regards his proposed directives as superior, in the sense we use the term, and he is at great pains in his various writings to show how action-guides are properly and consistently validated and vindicated.

Yet, is his position other-regarding? The essence of egoism would appear to be to leave the welfare of others out of account and to favor one's own self-interest. So it does, and had Hobbes developed his position in the thoroughly anti-social direction that is suggested in at least part of Nietzsche's thought, he would fall outside the arena of moral thinkers altogether.

As a matter of fact, however, one of the basic problems Hobbes sets out to solve is how to reconcile an egoistic bent of mind, which "naturally" strains towards chaos, with the requisites of cooperative social living, which entail at least a minimum of other-regardingness. Because Hobbes allows for the importance

of other-regardingness, and, accordingly, attends to those moral-species terms that are so fundamental to any moral system, he is entitled to the label "moral philosopher," if only barely. By allowing for other-regardingness in his own way, Hobbes thus modified his egoism.

Hobbes begins by singling out several action-guides he considers to be "fundamental laws of nature." The first is that "every man ought to endeavor peace, so far as he has the hope of attaining it." The second is that "a man be willing, when others are so too . . . to . . . be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For so long as every man holdeth this right of doing anything he liketh; so long are men in a condition of war." From the second law of nature, particularly, Hobbes can derive a whole range of action-guides having to do with fair treatment of others, with prevention of injury, fraud, and other morally relevant acts.

How does Hobbes validate these action-guides? He does so by contending that the conditions of peace (and fair treatment), as opposed to the conditions of war, are more advantageous to each individual's realizing his own good. And since every individual's seeking his own maximum good amounts to Hobbes' basic moral prescription, we have a fairly consistent justification, providing of course that one buys Hobbes' basic prescription.

In technical language, this is a *teleological* and *prudential* argument. It is teleological because it validates particular action-guides by showing that they are instrumental toward achieving a desired end (the self's interest, in this case). It is prudential in that it recommends that the overriding end of all the self's action is to watch out for oneself and one's own, which is to say, "Be prudent."

Hobbes' manner of vindicating his basic prescription sheds light on why he stresses the need to seek peace. In support of his basic prescription, Hobbes urges his readers to make some psychological observations regarding the nature of man and to see if these observations do not confirm Hobbes' view that men are so constituted that they seek their own good to the exclusion of everyone else's. Hobbes' picture of "a war of all against all" in the state of nature is but a dramatization of a fact about man's vicious egocentricity that appeared to him to be self-evident.

Hobbes, then, believes that men are faced with the following antinomy: they naturally seek gratification without any restraint or regulation, but the more avidly they seek gratification without restraint, the more they raise the probabilities of war and self-destruction, and, in turn, diminish their chances for obtaining what they seek. Reason and prudence, therefore, dictate

that men in their own interest yield to the sacrifices imposed by peace and order so as to minimize their losses.

There are many criticisms of Hobbesian egoism. Let me cite two, one on the level of vindication, and one on the level of validation. As to Hobbes' vindication for his position, we may wonder whether his theory of human nature is quite adequate.

Is man so utterly incapable of altruistic impulses as Hobbes alleges? More directly, how could we be sure that Hobbes' account of man's incapacity for altruism, for seeking ends other than those exclusively his own, is correct? It seems that no evidence could be imagined that might call Hobbes' egoistic theory into question. Whenever people tried to provide evidence, Hobbes displayed an ingenious ability to reduce even the most sublime of human actions and motives to egocentricity. But if no evidence could be imagined that might falsify the theory, then the theory is tautological. Hobbes has simply stipulated, rather than demonstrated, that all human action is exclusively egoistic. That seems rather an arbitrary maneuver, and, as such, does not provide much incentive for adopting Hobbes' basic prescription.

On the level of validating, Hobbes' brand of prudentialism raises severe problems so far as our common moral understanding is concerned. According to Hobbes, one ought to abide by the moral rules of justice, non-injury to others, etc. only if one could not get away with breaking them. For, logically, if the end I seek is my own interest (as the basic prescription dictates), then I "ought" to live by the rules of peace and order only so long as my interest is served in so doing. Obviously, if I can violate the rules with impunity by means of fraud, then I am bound by my position to do that. In Hobbes' view, the end clearly justifies any expedient means.

Hobbes' position is worth considering, not only because it expresses an outlook that is still found today, but more importantly because it identifies one of the key problems for moral reflection, namely, how to find a justifiable common standard for settling disputes over desired objectives. In Hobbes' state of nature, no such standard is available. All he can think to do is to try to persuade people that their individual interests dictate adopting moral rules. As we have seen, however, if they are consistent in following Hobbes' lead, they must endeavor at every point to act fraudulently wherever they can do so successfully. This state of affairs hardly supplies us with our common standard capable of determining who, as between two conflicting parties, has a "right" to pursue his interest. Rather, it simply restates and underscores the very problem that a moral position is in business to try to overcome.

2. *The Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham.* Bentham starts, although rather more systematically, from a position that bears some striking resemblance to Hobbes. But because, in developing his point of view, he tries to justify a common moral standard for settling disputes over interest, and thereby to overcome the chaotic implications of Hobbes' egoism, he is less marginally a moral philosopher than Hobbes was.

Bentham's thought meets all of our conditions for being "moral" thought. He is concerned to validate and to vindicate a system of action-guides that he clearly regards to be superior. In fact, he claims that it is only in the light of his particular moral position that "the words *ought,* and *right* and *wrong,* and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when [used] otherwise, they have none." Moreover, he seeks to build an understanding of other-regardingness explicitly into his system.

As is well known, Bentham's basic moral prescription, by which he validates all lower-order action-guides, is, "In all things, maximize pleasure (or happiness) and minimize pain," a prescription he labels "the principle of utility," or "the greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle." [2] In other words, actions are right or good insofar as they produce maximum pleasure, and wrong or bad if they do not. As Bentham saw quite clearly, everything depends on having a method for calculating or *computing* the degree of pleasure or pain that is the probable yield of a given action. Bentham thought he could provide such a procedure: he claimed that the pleasure could be broken down into things like intensity, duration, certainty, remoteness, fecundity, purity and extensiveness. By estimating numerically the extent to which each of these ingredients of pleasure was present or absent in the results of a given act, one could calculate the balance of pleasure over pain and arrive at the proper thing to do.

As we shall see more fully in a moment, Bentham believed, like Hobbes, that man was constituted so as to seek his own happiness, yet, in a crucial departure from Hobbes, he argues for the importance of what he calls "extra-regarding" or altruistic motives in human action. Indeed, he makes the striking claim that of all human motives, "goodwill [toward others] is that of which the dictates, taken in a general view, are surest of coinciding with those of the principle of utility. For the dictates of utility are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened benevolence." [3] By this maneuver Bentham is led to specify his principle of utility as "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," a specification that locates

[2] Jeremy Bentham, *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1961) p. 4.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 121.

Bentham's other-regarding emphasis. And by the end of his life he held firmly to the notion that conduct "most conducive to general happiness *always* coincides with that which conduces most to the happiness of the agent."

Let us note, in passing, that Bentham's system is, like Hobbes', both teleological and prudential, though for Bentham the end which justifies the means is now extended to include the interests of others as well as of the self.

Bentham's mode of vindicating his basic prescription is, like Hobbes, to appeal to the nature of man:

> Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.[4]

Like Hobbes, Bentham, too, has an atomistic view of man, so that collective terms like "the interests of the community," or the "common good" come to nothing more than "the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." There is no such thing, as there is in the thought of some philosophers, of a public good which is distinct from the aggregate happiness of the majority of members. Nevertheless, Bentham, unlike Hobbes, assumed a "natural identity of interests" in order to make plausible his view that the happiness of all always coincides with the happiness of the self. Unfortunately, we do not receive much indication as to why we should share this view.

There are several important deficiencies with Bentham's approach. But in registering our objections we ought not lose sight of the pertinence of the questions Bentham was asking to some of our own decision-making dilemmas. Much fun is made of Bentham's "felicific calculus," with its attempt to quantify values and its inability to discriminate between *qualities* and *kinds* of value. Bentham did, after all, say such things as, "quantities of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry."

But with all the problems, Bentham perceived that human beings, whether in personal or social life, are forced to quantify their values so as to make choices among them. "Taking my child out for a walk is worth much more to me than watching an hour of TV" is an illustration. Or, "Clean water and air, as well as preserving the area for camping and hunting, is worth much more than creating a few thousand jobs by building an oil refinery." I do not suggest that Bentham's procedure will help to

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

improve our decisions along these lines. I only suggest that Bentham was correct in perceiving that we are all engaged in the task of quantifying and comparing values all the time, and perhaps his attempt to develop a criterion for making value-judgments will stimulate us to reflect on the subtle calculus that we use, or perhaps ought to use, in settling value conflicts. This matter is one of the severest problems posed in the current literature on decision theory.

With respect to measuring and comparing values, there is a question whether Bentham took as seriously as he should have the matter of compromising among values, or of determining "trade-offs." The explanation for this shortcoming was his confidence in the natural identity of interests, and in the coincidence of the self's happiness and the happiness of all. We are surely losing our faith in these convictions, convictions which served to vindicate many of the basic action-guides of the 18th-century English world, most notably of Adam Smith's economic advice.

The next difficulty is, of course, Bentham's peculiar belief that his felicific calculus enabled him to explain how people assess the worth of the values they espouse. Bentham may have been persuaded that if the quantities of pleasure produced by pushpin and by poetry are equal, then that settles the matter of their respective worth, from everyone's point of view. But it is not hard to imagine some one disputing this, much as John Stuart Mill did. Mill was so perplexed by the implausibility of Bentham's method for determining the worth of values, that he developed his own, more objective scale of "lower" and "higher" pleasures, without abandoning the principle of utility as a basic moral prescription.

But Mill's perplexity over this aspect of Bentham's position locates a key problem in the history of thinking about morality, namely, *Is there an objective or transsubjective way of deciding what the worth of desired or valued objects is?* Is there some way, other than Bentham's unsuccessful procedure, for determining not simply what people *do* value, but what they *ought to* value? These questions are very relevant to the specifically moral aspects of Bentham's position, for unless we can decide precisely what constitutes the "right kind of happiness," how shall we be able to know what means we ought to adopt in order to bring such happiness to pass?

The final difficulty I want to mention resides more on the level of validation, and concerns the adequacy of Bentham's basic moral prescription. As in the case of Hobbes, the implications of Bentham's position raise problems so far as our common moral understanding goes. The problem is that if right actions are deter-

mined by their utility in promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number, then many things we ordinarily find quite offensive could be justified. For example, the majority of the members of a group might, in the interests of their aggregate happiness, deprive a minority of their welfare, and exploit them mercilessly—all in the name of maximizing the happiness of the greatest number. In short, the utilitarian position has no logical defense against the tyranny of the majority!

3. *The Innovations of Immanuel Kant.* Kant has been credited, rightly in my view, with causing a "Copernican Revolution in Ethics." The reference is apt because he did not simply tinker with other people's views and make this or that alteration. For better or worse, he completely overhauled *the way* in which people thought about moral reasoning.

Like Hobbes and Bentham, he was a moral philosopher, in our sense of the word "moral." He was passionately concerned to clarify the meaning and use of the action-guiding legitimacy words, like right/wrong, good/bad, duty, obligation, ought, and the like. In fact, a case could be made that his whole moral philosophy was simply an exercise in the conceptual analysis of those terms. Moreover, he wished to try to understand how it is that the standard moral action-guides against arbitrary killing, stealing, lying, and in favor of benevolence, and fair treatment, come as they do, to be considered superior, or in his famous work, "categorical."

Finally, he was dissatisfied with the account given by prudentialists like Hobbes and Bentham as to how moral action-guides are properly validated and vindicated. He argues, as we shall see, that the whole teleological form of moral justification rests on very weak foundations and also does a serious injustice to our ordinary moral experience. As part of his radical attack on the prudential mode of justification, he contends that people like Bentham and Hobbes totally confuse the manner in which moral persons ought properly to take the welfare of others into account. As I say, Kant declared total war on the prudentialists.

He opens his attack against a weak-spot we also discovered in the defenses of the prudentialists: the failure to provide any objective or transsubjective standard for deciding what the worth of a value is; or for deciding, in other words, what values people ought to hold. Hobbes despaired of finding any such standard. He counselled, you recall, that people "ought" to pursue their own egocentric interests so long as they can get away with it, a recommendation which leads, as we saw, to a peculiar form of morality indeed. Bentham, we suggested, provided an implausible standard. Kant's position was that if we are to have

a morality at all, then we will have to have some general common standards which are binding on and direct the way people pursue what they consider to be good, or in their interest. We will need some imperatives, some "rules of the game," which, as he liked to put it, "determine the will." However, it is unlikely, he thought, that we will discover our common standards by trying to come up with some definition of what "good" or "happiness" or "pleasure" *really* is for all men, whether that standard is Bentham's felicific calculus or some other philosopher's notion of what *really* is everyone's common interest. Kant writes:

> Where one places his happiness is a question of the particular feeling of pleasure or displeasure in each man, and even of the differences in needs occasioned by changes of feeling in one and the same man . . . For the wills of all do not have one and the same object, but each person has his own . . . which, to be sure, can *accidentally* agree with the purposes of others. . . .[5]

Given what Kant regarded as the inevitable variations and fluctuations in values within the same society—not to mention among different cultures—any teleological moral justification can yield only *hypothetical* prescriptions, rather than the truly binding or *categorical* prescriptions Kant believes to be essential for having a morality at all. Hypothetical prescriptions are, as we saw, characteristic of both Hobbes' and Bentham's positions: In Hobbes' case, '*If* you see that keeping a promise or living up to a contract is in your interest, *then* you ought to do it. If not, not.' In Bentham's case, '*If* a majority of citizens are intensely disgusted by the sight of black-skinned people in their midst, *then* they ought (or have the right) to restrict them to reservations.' A morality that is grounded in something so fluctuating and unstable as views of happiness or the good, can have only fluctuating and unstable action-guides. It is a simple matter of logic, so far as Kant is concerned.

Kant's counterproposal is interesting. He contends that since no particular view of the good, no special definition of value, no single end can be justified in such a way that it can be compelling for all men, then, by a process of elimination, all that can be justified is that each person have a presumptive right to pursue his good freely as he sees it, consistent with the equal right of every other person to do the same. Thus, all restrictions, all constraints on action, (all moral action-guides) are derived from this fundamental right of every person to equal freedom, or to "autonomy," in one of Kant's favorite words.

The supporting argument, in a form considerably more succinct than Kant ever put it, can be systematized as follows:

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[5] Immanual Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 24–25.

1. Men justify actions by demonstrating, at least to their own satisfaction, how the actions are consonant with the ends or values they seek (this is what "justification" in practical affairs means).
2. No ends or values can be conclusively or compellingly justified over any others, given the irreducible variability of values.
3. Therefore, no actions can be justified in which one man coercively imposes his values or ends upon another without the other's having a chance to agree to, or consent to, or adopt for himself, the new set of values or ends.

This argument does not, of course, rule out that one man may believe his values to be superior to someone else's. It simply means that causing another man to act on these values depends on the other man's having been *freely persuaded,* or, as we said, having a chance for free consent.

Though Kant employs several lines of argument in defense of his general position, this one clearly serves to support the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the formulation I consider to be the central one for Kant, and the one that can be taken as Kant's basic moral prescription: "Treat others as ends in themselves and never as means only." More tersely, this basic prescription can be understood as requiring *respect for persons.*

If Kant's argument is successful here, then he has indeed discovered a prescription that is binding upon the practical decisions human beings make, a prescription that is thus "categorical," and not merely "hypothetical." It would follow that the practical pursuit of certain ends and values would be excluded, if such pursuit infringed upon the right of others to their autonomy or basic respect. Thus, rather obviously, all forms of arbitrary treatment, including the deprivation of the basic welfare of others, is something no one has a right to perpetrate without first providing for the right to consent of the affected parties. In this way, our moral species-terms such as restrictions on fraud, deception, cruelty etc., are accounted for.

Furthermore, on the logic of his position, Kant might have argued (though, to my knowledge, he did not), that the condition of respect for persons requires a positive concern, a disposition of benevolence to those rendered incompetent, by circumstance, from determining their ends and pursuing them freely. Here special treatment for children and involuntarily disadvantaged people would appear to be required by the basic prescription. In short, respect for persons obliges action calculated to increase the competence of persons as independent decision-makers. To refuse to engage in such action, such as refusing to enable one's children to become independent, would be an example

of treating another as a means to one's own ends, rather than as an end-in-himself.

The form of Kant's argument, in contrast with the teleological form employed by Hobbes and Bentham, is called *deontological.* This simply means that we have an argument that takes *a means of action as right-in-itself,* rather than *as right because it serves some special end.* Kant's attempt was to undercut the very form of argument employed by Hobbes and Bentham, in which the end is held to justify the means, and replace it with a form of argument in which the means of action impose some limiting conditions on the kinds of ends that may be pursued.

Kant's mode of vindicating his basic moral prescription takes the form of an elaboration of the sort of argument I provided above. That is, one tries, by analyzing the moral concepts that people use to discover what is built into or assumed in those concepts, and then try to show people what the consequences of such assumptions are for living out their moral life.

Whatever may be one's final assessment of Kant's position, and I have shamelessly oversimplified it here, one will have to agree, I think, that Kant is, more than Hobbes or Bentham, the philosopher of a liberal society. That is true because he provides a foundation (whether successful or not, every man must judge for himself) for a society with a strong moral emphasis upon individual rights, autonomy and respect for persons. Kant, unlike Bentham, is able to provide a moral basis for such things as the bill of rights, which is clearly for the protection of the rights of minorities, and is considered binding *no matter what the majority may decide to do.* And Kant, in distinction from Hobbes, can give a reason why one "ought" to refrain from cruelty or discriminatory treatment, even though such action might be carried out with impunity.

CONCLUSION

Rather than survey broadly many of the traditions and developments in the history of moral philosophy, I have decided to analyze only a few positions. My principle of selection was not random. I chose three positions which have exerted and continue to exert enormous influence on the moral reflection of Anglo-Saxon men and women. Moreover, I set the positions up as I believe they should be set up, in the form of a disputation. It is in dispute that these positions (and all positions) were born, and it is by means of an examination of the dispute that we can appreciate what is deficient and what is of enduring value in them.

Frankly, I am doubtful that grand surveys have much utility

when it comes to moral instruction. In my view, moral instruction goes on when people are *engaged* in moral discussion and argument, when they learn for themselves why debates have gone on as they have, and when they arrive at their own solutions to the disputes. For, above all, moral philosophy is not a matter solely for the classroom. It springs up in response to the living experience of ordinary individuals trying to make moral decisions and develop moral positions. It has been my endeavor to give some glimpses as to how that is the case.

ETHICAL THEORY AND VALUE EDUCATION

Theodore R. Weber, Ph.D.

The commissioning statement for this article asked for a "position paper on the schools of ethics now having adherents among respected scholars bringing an advocacy for those schools or that school which seem(s) to hold the most promise of utility in value education in the Army." In attempting to fulfill that commission in the light of those stipulations, I have examined several contemporary ethical theories and have decided to propose the moral philosophy of H. Richard Niebuhr as the most adequate for the stated purpose. However, inasmuch as Niebuhr's ethic never was brought to completion in published statements on principles or criteria of concrete moral decision, I have drawn on the insights of other schools to augment the basic framework of moral analysis and action which he offers.[1] In order to provide for some correlation between ethical theory and educational theory, I have employed as a conceptual tool the basic scheme of moral education theory inferred by Lawrence Kohlberg from his developmental psychology.

I. Some Methodological Problems

The necessity of thinking through the methodological implications of this task has brought me up against some problems that were not acknowledged (and possibly not foreseen) in the commissioning statement. One of these problems concerns the implications of ethical theory *per se* for the concept of "value education" and the centrality of the concept in the educational process. The other concerns the manner in which the stipulations "utility in value education in the Army" influence the selection of ethical theories to be studied. Because both of these methodological problems must be taken into account in rethinking "value education in the Army," I shall begin my presentation with an attempt to explain their meaning and importance.

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[1] James Gustafson writes in the introduction to Niebuhr's *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 41, ". . . no one wishes more than he [*i.e.*, Gustafson] that H. Richard Niebuhr could have written for himself a volume on 'The Principles of Christian Action,' and a third on 'Christian Responsibility in the Common Life.' "

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1. Ethics is the critical study of moral reasoning and moral action. When we approach the matter of "value education" from the standpoint of a general study of ethical theory, we assume, of course, that we are considering *moral* values and not some other kind such as aesthetic or monetary values. From that standpoint we recognize that values are not fixed as to nature and role in human life but are contingently related to particular ethical orientations. What the moral values are and what kind of role they play in the moral process depend in large part on the kind of ethical theory accepted and employed.

Perhaps the point can be clarified by a brief consideration of the three major types of ethical theory identified by H. Richard Niebuhr, and the value implications of each one.[2] According to Niebuhr, the moral life may be characterized in three principal ways. First, it may be thought of as goal-seeking or aspiration, a life-process in which one seeks to realize the good—and above all, the highest good. In this type of ethical theory, values would be either "end-values"—the objects of aspiration and striving—or "instrumental values"—the means which efficaciously and appropriately promote the attainment of the end.[3] The moral life would consist in striving after "good" ends with rightly chosen means. "Value education" would consist first in identifying the end-values to the learner and evoking his commitment to them, and second in shaping his ability to make judgments concerning the propriety and productiveness of the means.

Second, the moral life may be thought of as the fulfillment of duty or obligation. The content of morality would come to expression in an authoritative command or law, and morally correct action would consist in complying dutifully with that which was authoritatively required. Given this ethical orientation, the learner might be taught the value of orderly legal processes and of this particular legal order, and he might be introduced to the personal and social benefits (values) of a system in which some command and others obey. But the principal concern of the educator would be to inculcate the moral virtue of obedience, and he would be concerned only secondarily and perhaps instrumentally with generating appreciation for the process or system. In fact, the educator might deliberately avoid "value education," on the grounds that if the learner were encouraged to "evaluate" the order he might begin to think of justifiable grounds for disobedience.

Third, the moral life may be thought of as responsibility-in-

[2] The three types are analyzed in Chapter One of *The Responsible Self*.

[3] I have used the term "end-values" rather than "intrinsic values" a) to assert the teleological character of the relationship and b) to allow for situations in which the "end-values" of one relationship become instrumental to other end-values.

relationship. I shall explain this ethical theory in more detail later, because it is the one which Niebuhr himself advocates. Essentially, it defines morality with reference to our accountability to others who stand in a claiming relationship to us. Value arises and is objectified in these relationships. To teach "value," therefore, is to teach the meaning of particular relationships or kinds of relationships and to sensitize the learner to what is good for the relational partners under the terms of and by reason of the relationship. Value is relative to the relationship, but within the relationship itself it is objective.[4]

The central implication of this analysis is that "value education" is not separable from commitment to a particular ethical orientation. If the ethical orientation is not made explicit, "value education" almost certainly will be understood as "education to the pursuit of certain values." The suggested implicit orientation is that of an ethic of aspiration or goal-seeking. If the educator is aware of that relationship and intends it, he at least will have the advantage of comprehensiveness in his concept of the educational process. If he is not aware of it, he will be attempting to engage in "value education" without recognizing the relationality of moral values to the particular mode of moral reasoning which communicates their meaning and assigns them their function. It is possible, under those circumstances, that his educational procedures may contradict his ethical orientation.

In a sense, therefore, the decision to approach value education by way of ethical theory results in turning it to a deeper level. We cannot be satisfied with asking, "What school of ethics is most useful to value education in the Army?" If value education has a fixed meaning, we need only inquire which ethical orientation is implied in the way that it is conceptualized. If it is not fixed, its meaning will be inferred from whichever ethical orientation is affirmed. This study assumes, of course, that the meaning is not fixed. Therefore I suggest that the really basic question for inquiry is, "How do we intend to conceptualize the nature of the moral life, and how are values identified as to nature and function in that conceptualization?" If we start at that point, we shall have a better understanding of what we are doing as educators. Given that approach, perhaps we should speak of "moral education" rather than "value education." [5]

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[4] The main source for Niebuhr's value theory is his essay "The Center of Value," in *Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative*, ed. R. N. Anshen (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), pp. 162–175. The same essay appears in a slightly revised version in Niebuhr's *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 100–114.

[5] Chaplain (COL) Bertram C. Gilbert appears to use the terms "value education" and "moral education" interchangeably in his article "Value Education," in *Military Chaplains' Review*, I (April, 1972), pp. 49–51.

2. However, the rephrasing of the question as indicated above does not open the field to the consideration of all ethical orientations which may have "respected scholars" as their adherents. The further stipulations tend to exclude those ethical theories which are not readily adaptable to an educational process and/or which are fundamentally contradictory to the structures and expectations of corporate responsibility in the military institution. These stipulations have led me to exclude from consideration such ethical theories as radical existentialism, emotivism, Ayn Rand's "objectivism" with its "virtue of selfishness," and the wholly teleological ethics of some revolutionary ideologies ("What is right is what serves to promote the revolution"). I have no qualms about excluding ethical theories (such as radical existentialism) which by their very nature are not presumed to be teachable. I am uneasy, however, about excluding those which seem incompatible with the institution. Exclusion on these grounds implies that a particular ethical orientation with its attendant value commitments is inoperative in the process of inquiry. It may rule out precisely those options which particular individuals might consider most "ethical" in terms of their own conscientious perception of reality and responsibility. I emphasize the point in order to encourage a) awareness of the manner in which the presuppositions of the inquiring institution limit the scope of inquiry, and b) sensitivity to the situation of conscience of those whose ethical orientations may bring them into conflict with the structures and expectations of the institution.

Having thus pointed to the principles of selection and exclusion implicit in the commissioning statement, I now must state that my choice of the ethic which I am advocating in this paper was not governed by those criteria. It is the one which I usually employ in any situation. I contend that it is eminently suitable for purposes of moral education in the Army, but I affirm it not primarily for its utility in that situation but because of its greater adequacy for clarifying and guiding the process of moral reasoning. Moreover, this ethic allows the possibility of conflict within and with the institution, but it is not characteristically opposed to institutions in general or to this particular one. In fact, it is highly useful in this type of setting precisely because it suggests a model for coordinating conflicting moral claims in intra- and inter-institutional relationships.

II. Some Ethical Theories: A Critical Survey

The ethical theories set forth below have been chosen to conform to the aforementioned stipulations and also to provide both contrast and supplementation to the responsiblist ethics of H.

Richard Niebuhr. A brief sketch of the basic elements of Niebuhr's ethic will be given first, followed by pointed and critical summaries of the others. Finally (in this major section), a summary analysis will be offered of the ways in which the ethical theories can contribute to value education (or preferably, moral education) in the Army.

A. *H. R. Niebuhr's "Responsible Ethics."* The title of the principal work setting forth Niebuhr's moral philosophy is *The Responsible Self.*[6] Both of the dominant words in the title are appropriate. It is an ethic of responsibility developed and interpreted with heavy dependence on self-theory. Before delineating his analysis of the process of moral reasoning, let us see how he uses these basic concepts.

In Niebuhr's view, the several meanings of the term *responsible* all provide clues to the nature of moral action. First, moral action—like all human action—is action in response to the actions of others upon us. The human individual is at the center of a field of interactions. He must cope with the multiplicity of actions addressed to him—repelling, repressing, regularizing, cooperating, coordinating, conceding. The variety of "coping procedures" indicates that the self at the center of these interactions is neither inert material nor an organism incapable of any degree of determination of its responses. The self does exercise some shaping influence over its responses, but it does not initiate "moral action" from a dead stop. This view is more adequate than the "goal-seeking" (teleological) and "obedience" (deontological) theories in its recognition both of the responsive nature of moral action and of the comprehensiveness of the moral situation of the acting self. In real life, the self is not conceded the freedom to survey the field of realizable goals and decide which one or ones it wants to pursue, nor can its moral involvements be reduced to a single commitment such as obedience to superior authority. It must juggle and toss back with correct timing and accuracy the many challenges which life throws at it—often from all directions simultaneously.

Second, the self in responding to action upon it is not merely reacting, it is *answering.* That is, it is correlating its response with its understanding of the meaning of the action. What it does in responding is to act in relation to the expectations which it perceives in the action towards it, and to the reactions which it anticipates.

Third, the self is responsible also in the sense that it is accountable for its actions. "Accountability" in turn means several things. It means that the self recognizes accountability or an-

[6] *Op. cit.*

swerability to some "other" which places a claim on the self's action in this situation, expects it to be faithful to the fulfillment of the claim, and judges its performance. It means that the acting self takes the anticipated results of its actions seriously. It means, finally, that the self acts with the awareness that it must take the consequences for its actions.

Niebuhr's choice of the term "self" is no casual use of language. The term is employed deliberately to convey the relational and reflexive nature of the human individual. One's identity consists less in his psychological structure and capacities than in his relations to "others" of varying degrees of significance for him. The self exists at the center of these intersecting relationships, and the particular combination of relationships is the principal ground of its uniqueness. Development of personhood is a process of reflexive response to the actions, expectations and images (of one's self) to these "others." Moreover, there are two important corollaries to this theory of selfhood. One is that selfhood depends on community existence, inasmuch as the relationships which confer identity must be constant and not transient. The other is that selfhood is a particular history of relationships and not merely a present combination. The self remembers who it is and who others are, and it bases its anticipations and projections on this memory.

Given this view of the moral situation of the responsible self, the process of moral reasoning, according to Niebuhr, should follow these steps: First, in encountering an action which calls for a response (or a bombardment of actions which call for multiple responses), one must ask, "What is going on?" The situation must be clarified. Issues, actors and options must be identified. Of particular importance in this stage is the process of interpretation. To know how to respond, one must know what the action means. For example, where a base commander has to deal with overt hostility between black and white troops under his command, he must look deeply enough into the situation to know what the root of the difficulty is. Does it cover the matter adequately to conclude that a few "troublemakers" are at fault, and that the conflict will evaporate when these men are disciplined appropriately or removed from the scene? Is the problem one of personality conflict among a few individuals who recruit as allies other men who otherwise might not be involved? Is there *de facto* discrimination, either unrecognized or knowingly practiced? Are there underlying factors of group resentment which, with any effective catalyst, can lead to interracial conflict even where no real discrimination exists? Is there evidence for giving credence to claims that "outside inter-

ference" is the effective catalyst? There may be common elements in all situations of this type, yet each situation will have its own individuality. How should the base commander "read" the particular conflict within his jurisdiction? Accuracy of interpretation is necessary to responsible action, and one who intends to act responsibly (*i.e.*, with accountability) must show special care in the work of interpretation by sensitizing himself to what the other is communicating through words or actions.

Second, as the dimensions and elements of the moral situation begin to become clear, one must ask, "To whom or what am I responsible?" The question is crucial, for at least two major reasons. One is that claims upon one's action are affirmed or denied by recognition or non-recognition of responsibility. For example, a wealthy man confronted by a condition of desperate poverty may feel compelled by the love of God (to whom he is responsible) to share his wealth with the poor (to whom, in common humanity under God, he is also responsible). Or he may, with a self-satisfied conscience, elect to let them starve on the grounds that they are not his responsibility. A second reason is that the nature of the responsibility-relationship provides the framework for concretely determining the content of responsibility. The responsibilities of the marriage relationship are not equivalent to those of the roommate relationship. In view of the fact that the most demanding moral decisions usually are those which require a choice between conflicting but nevertheless justifiable claims, one often is pushed to the point of asking, "To whom or what am I *primarily* responsible?" This contextual determination of priorities in responsibility is the single most effective revealer of one's true identity. It also illustrates the intimate connection between ethics and faith.

Third, Niebuhr insisted that relationships involved more than "I" and "Thou." For one thing, they involved a third element—a common referent which was at once the basis, the symbol and the conferrer of meaning for the relationship. It might be a common "cause," God, the nation, the church. In making moral decisions the parties to the relationship would be constrained to refer to this third element to determine, assess and confirm their responsibilities. For another, it involved a community with the same moral language, the same understanding of responsibility and criteria of judgment, which by persisting through time would provide both the continuing tests of moral practice and the continuing authority to evoke morally responsible action. It should be apparent that this element in the process is the primary repository of values, and that "value education" should be particularly attuned to the investigation of its concrete implications.

Fourth, the conclusion of the process of moral reasoning was a "fitting" decision—the one that was contextually appropriate in the light of interpreted actions and determinate responsibilities. Conceivably the "fitting" decision in a given situation might be to pursue a particular goal or obey a particular law or command, but moral decision could not be equated with either goal-seeking or obedience. It was a decision which gathered together all of the relevant factors in the total environment of interaction and called them to order in relation to predominating responsibilities.

This analytical scheme, as it stands, is a phenomenology of moral decision-making. It is useful in its abstractness for clarifying the process of moral reasoning and thereby identifying the basic elements of moral education. But it does not tell us explicitly who the "significant others" are or what expectations attend what kind of relationships or which values are held in community as the common referents of the members. Niebuhr certainly did not ignore these matters. Most of his writing on ethics was distinctly theological in character, and its theology was the "radical monotheism" of faith and hope in God as he is known to us in Jesus Christ.[7] He was willing to make his own confession and identify his own communities, and with reference to those concretions to make his moral decisions. But the lectures which make up the bulk of *The Responsible Self* were intended as analyses of the ground and structure of human moral action as such without regard to the confession of the actor.[8] To those who expect a clear delineation of value and identification of responsibilities, an analytical framework will prove considerably less than satisfying. But for an institution like the U.S. Army, which cannot make a religious confession institutionally but must deal with pluralism in all dimensions of human commitment—religious, political, ethnic, racial—an ethical theory couched in terms of responsibility and delineating the process of moral decision-making in the light of a social and historical concept of the self should be precisely the instrument that is most useful in guiding the re-thinking of the requirements of moral education.

B. *"Institution" Ethics.* Niebuhr's concept of the "fitting" decision is the logical outcome of an ethic of responsibility, but it lacks the precise criteria of situational determination of responsibility which he might have provided had he lived to complete the publication of his projected writings on ethics. Working

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[7] Chapters Four and Five are the more theological chapters of *The Responsible Self.* See also his *The Meaning of History* (New York: Macmillan, 1946); *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951); and the previously mentioned *Radical Monotheism and Western Faith.*

[8] His statement of purpose is found on p. 45.

with his basic framework, however, one can incorporate insights from other theories which can provide more concrete guidance in determining what is "fitting." Such usage of other ethical theories also will enable us to consider them in their own right.

One such theory derives from what is called in German "Das Institutions Problem." [9] Its central point is that one can infer the moral requirements of action from knowledge of the nature of the institution in which he is participating.

> The theory draws attention to the institutions in which human society is organized, *institutions personnes* of which a marriage or family is one instance, an industrial firm is another, a government department is another and so is a hospital, not to mention voluntary societies set up for particular cultural or other purposes. Within such institutions the actions of individuals are limited by rules and the validity of the rules lies in their consistency with "the idea of the institution." [10]

To know the basic purpose of the institution—its controlling values, the structural incorporation of values in institutional goals and rules of procedures—is to know the general framework of intra-institutional behavior. To know one's status in the institutional hierarchy, one's role or roles, one's office and its duties, is to know the specifics which fit the general framework and serve it. Actually, the theory is set up as a legal theory rather than as an ethical theory, but precisely because it is intended as a *normative* theory of law it brings to light the basis and implications of institution-oriented morality as well as law.

It should be obvious that such an approach brings greater specificity of guidance to the concept of "fitting" decision in an ethic of responsibility, particularly when the questions of moral responsibility are raised in an institutional setting such as the US Army. However, an "institution ethic" as a self-standing ethical theory has certain limitations which should be noted in passing.

1. Institutions do not exist for their own sakes, and therefore they do not generate their own purposes and basic norms. They are human constructions to provide corporate organization for

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[9] This theory has undergone extensive development in recent German Protestant theological ethics in the attempt to develop social ethics without reliance on either natural law or the Lutheran "orders." Two examples are Rolf-Peter Callies, *Eigentum als Institution* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1962) and Hans Dombois, *Recht als Institution* (Witten Ruhr: Luther Verlag, 1956). However, H. H. Schrey, H. H. Walz and W. A. Whitehouse, in their *The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1956) claim that theory of institutions is associated primarily with the French legal theorist Maurice Hauriou. To my knowledge, there has been no comparable development of this ethical method in Christian social ethics in the United States.

[10] Schrey, *et al.*, pp. 30–31.

the achievement of human ends. Within the terms of that definition they might be considered purely contractual social instruments, and if one is concerned to know the ends of the institution in order to spell out concretely the meaning of intra-institutional responsibility, he need only inquire of those who contracted to set up the institution. But those persons who have formulated "institutional theory" for purposes of providing ethical and legal guidance always have insisted on going beyond the contractual level of institutional analysis. They recognize, of course, that institutions are heavily laden with contractual elements, and that even the same type of institution is subject to wide variation in its historical expressions. Nonetheless, they affirm that institutions bring to social expression constant needs and aspirations of fundamental human nature—the very fact that there are "types" of institutions is offered as evidence—that their basic norms therefore must be sought in human nature, and that they are subject to correction, reformation, even revolution, in relation to their adequacy to those norms.

But what is "fundamental human nature"? That is the initial problem for an "institutional ethic." If those who participate in the institution agree on a particular natural law definition or a particular theological definition of the nature of man, the process of ethical inference can proceed from that point. But if there is no such consensus, the moral expectations of institutional participation are bound to seem arbitrary to at least some if not many of the institution's personnel. Where such a vacuum exists, the ruling elite in the institution usually attempt to develop an institutional ideology which establishes their own interests and represents them as the interests of the whole, thereby inviting or enticing the loyalty of non-elites. The ruling elite, of course, are not always successful in overcoming the basic inadequacies of institutional justification. When they fail, the non-elites may abandon the institution or remain on uncommitted terms. The latter means that they work under duress or exploit the institution for their own immediate purposes or comply apathetically with institutional regulations. These alternatives may be familiar to persons who have observed the disintegration of morale and authority in a military organization whose members have lost the reasonably clear common conviction concerning their reasons for fighting.

Because of these considerations, the common institutions of a pluralistic society like the United States must exercise particular care in articulating and institutionalizing the norms which provide their rationale. They must maintain an ever-sensitive consciousness of their servant role in the society. They must cor-

relate as closely as possible with the broadest consensus values of the society. They must be able to afford considerable flexibility (variable in terms of the nature of the institution [11]) because of the diversity of views with regard to the normative basis and purpose of the institution.

2. Human persons almost always are related to several or many institutions simultaneously. Often the claims of these institutions can be coordinated by the person who is subject to them, but sometimes they cannot be, and it then becomes necessary to compromise or repudiate one or another set of claims. Decisions of that type—which involve inter-institutional choices—cannot be resolved by an "institution ethic." The ethical theory must be sufficiently comprehensive to include both the intra-institutional claims and the means of resolving inter-institutional conflicts. Niebuhr's "ethic of responsibility" provides that kind of framework.

3. Purely personal relationships between associates of a given institution usually cannot be arranged in relation to institutional expectations, and usually they should not be. Exceptions to this rule would be the family and, perhaps, the church. Guardians of an institution may attempt to displace personal conflicts among associates of the institution by appeals to loyalty to the "team" or to the "chief," but for the parties to put aside their differences in response to that appeal may not be the most morally responsible resolution.

There are other problems of the "institution ethic" that could be noted, but an exhaustive catalogue is not necessary to show that this ethic is not sufficient as a sole or primary guide for moral or value education despite its obvious affinity to the Army situation. However, institutional existence is a "given" of social relatedness, and an inquiry into institutional expectations is an important aspect of answering the questions "What is going on?" and "To whom or what am I responsible" and "What is the fitting thing to do in this situation?"

c. *Rawls on Rules.* During recent decades, the discussion of ethical theory has passed through a phase during which rule-ethics was on the defensive. The reasons for this development are diverse, complicated and interrelated. One set of reasons involves the crisis in the western natural law tradition, which as the most authoritative moral tradition was the principal repository of authoritative rules. Another set of reasons, related at important points to the first, involves various arguments concerning the unsuitability of rules for the determination of moral

[11] The limits of flexibility of a military institution are manifest in the exclusion from conscription of persons who are pacifists on principle.

action. Some of these arguments are that each moment of decision is fully unique and cannot be subsumed under a general category; that the concrete elements of a situation ultimately must determine the content of moral responsibility; that presumably firm rules must bend if not dissolve before pragmatic necessities; that rule-ethics encourages "legalism"—observing rules for their own sake and self-righteously making a virture of rule-obedience; that prior rule-determination of behavior destroys the freedom and autonomy of individual action and imposes a heteronomous claim on the acting subject.

There was and is much to be said for these criticisms of rule-ethics. No matter how persuasive and influential they were, however, they could not once and for all put an end to the ethical role of rules. Neither individual nor group could contemplate and calculate each and every decision which confronted it. Therefore, if only for the practical reason of economy of time and effort, it was necessary to let many decisions be governed by categorical presciptions. Also, predictability was necessary to both interpersonal and corporate morality, and predictability assumed the constancy of rule-governed behavior. Rule-ethics inevitably bounced back. As Mark Twain said of himself, the reports of its death were greatly exaggerated.[12]

On the other hand, the criticisms of rule-ethics could not simply be ignored. When ethical theorists, therefore, began to re-think the role of rules they had to take full account of the objections which had been raised in the course of the controversy. An account of the developments in this discussion would make this presentation far too lengthy.[13] What I propose to do is to set forth the basic elements of one of the most influential and lucid defenses of rule-ethics, and one that has been developed in full awareness of the aforementioned objections. I refer to the analysis of "two concepts of rules" by John Rawls, formerly of Cornell University and now on the faculty of Harvard University.[14]

Rawls developed his argument as a response to criticisms of utilitarianism which held that bizarre consequences could result from the consistent application of the utilitarian criterion of "greatest good of the greatest number" in every situation of

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[12] It is ironic that "situation ethics" should gain public visibility, especially in the writings of Joseph Fletcher, only after many academic ethicists had come to assume that the "situation ethics debate" had run its course. For Fletcher's writings, see his *Situation Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966) and *Moral Responsibility* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967). See also Harvey Cox, ed. *The Situation Ethics Debate* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968).

[13] Significant writings dealing with the development include James M. Gustafson, "Context Versus Principle: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," *Harvard Theological Review*, 58 (1965), pp. 171–202; Gene H. Outka and Paul Ramsey, eds. *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics* (New York: Scribners, 1968).

[14] John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *The Philosophical Review*, LXIV (January, 1955), pp. 3–32.

legal or moral decision. It could happen, for example, that during a wave of particularly heinous crimes a court could administer severe punishment for the crime to a person known to the court to be innocent. Despite the known innocence of the punished person, the act would be justified on the grounds of its usefulness in signalling to the guilty persons what was in store for them should they be apprehended. Rawls' reply to this criticism is that it fails to distinguish "between justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules. . . ." [15] Utilitarianism, in his view, does not require that every act be judged by the criterion of general utility. To the contrary, it recognizes that certain institutions or practices (sets of regular procedures) may be justified on utilitarian grounds, but that their internal requirements will be governed by the practice itself and not by immediate reference to the ultimate criterion. Any act which falls under the practice therefore must be subject to the rules of the practice and not to the question of whether it is "best on the whole." Consequently, the innocent person in the example given above could not rightfully be punished on merely utilitarian grounds. The rules of practice of the legal institution (an institution justified by its general usefulness to the society) do not permit the knowing punishment of an innocent person, even if such punishment could be shown to be for the "greatest good of the greatest number."

The reason why critics often miss this point, according to Rawls, is that it is concealed from them by the concept of "rule" which they assume to be implied by a utilitarian ethical theory. In order to expose the influential hidden factor, he draws a logical distinction between two concepts of rules—"summary rules" and "rules of practices." "Summary rules" are generalizations derived from knowledge of what persons usually do when they apply the principal criterion to cases of a particular type. They are "maxims" or "rules of thumb." They do not bear any authority to say that utilitarians "ought" to act in accordance with their directives. The extent of their authority (if it can be called that) is the statistical probability that a person following the "summary rule" will have a greater likelihood of faithfully implementing the utilitarian criterion than one who applies the criterion directly to the case without reference to the rule. But in any given situation a person is free to disregard the summary rule if he believes that his deviating action is best "on the whole." In fact, he is morally obliged to abandon the rule if he comes to that conclusion. It is this concept of "rule" which, according

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

to Rawls, invites and allows the criticism of utilitarianism represented in the punishment example. And it is the failure to recognize a second concept of "rule," entirely congruent with utilitarianism, which hinders effective reply to the criticism.

"Rules of practices" are systems of rules which are justified collectively by the socially useful purpose which they implement and administer. If "summary rules" are "rules of thumb," these rules are more like "rules of the game." When one agrees to play the game, one agrees implicitly if not explicitly to play according to its rules. One does not—in the middle of the game—ask for an alteration of the rules by reference to a principle extraneous to the concept of the game itself. To use Rawls' example, if one is playing baseball one does not request a fourth strike for oneself on the ground that such an allowance would be best "on the whole." "Rules of practices" are one remove from the ultimate criterion of the ethical theory, but the removal is highly significant for acts which are subsumed under the practice. The removal means that such acts are referred to the rules of the practice and not to the ultimate criterion. Hence the employment within a general utilitarian theory of rules not immediately derived from or referable to the utilitarian criterion is not a contradiction.

Rawls does not mean to say that the rules are absolute and admit of no exception. There may be exceptions, but they are allowed by the concept of the practice and not by another principle which overrides the concept of the practice. Moreover, the rules may be altered, but again it must be said that they are to be altered with reference to the nature and intent of the practice and not to extraneous considerations.

At this point one may ask what difference there is, if any, between Rawls' "rules of practices" and the previously examined "institution ethic." I am not sure that I see any. The reason for examining both and for treating them separately are, first, that the "institution ethic" (particularly in the context of recent German theological ethics) draws attention primarily to the nature of the institution which generates the rules, whereas Rawls' analysis focuses primarily on the rules themselves, and second, that Rawls' analysis provides the helpful distinction between the types of rules and their respective relationships to basic ethical criteria.

Although Rawls' distinction is intended to serve utilitarianism, it is adaptable to any ethical theory, as Paul Ramsey has shown by restating the arguments in relation to Christian *agape*.[16]

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[16] "Two Concepts of General Rules in Christian Ethics," *Ethics*, LXXVI (April, 1966), pp. 192–207.

Ramsey finds the concept of "rules of practices" highly congenial to his own concept of "in-principled love," and to his own efforts to move contemporary Protestant ethics from what he takes to be a wholly consequentialist orientation.[17] On the other hand, the "summary rules" concept serves to characterize the role of rules in Joseph Fletcher's "situation ethics," and thereby also to illuminate the central differences between the types of Christian ethics offered by Ramsey and Fletcher.

But of primary concern for our purposes is how the two concepts relate to H. R. Niebuhr's responsiblist ethics. At first glance, it would seem that the "summary rules" would be more appropriate as guides to the "fitting" action—partly because Niebuhr asserts the primacy of responsibility in all action, and partly because he was determined to maintain his ethic as contextual, open, free of legalism. It is possible, however, to make at least as strong a case for the prospect of incorporating the "rules of practices." The possibility is implied in his effort to develop a "social existentialism" [18] and in his insistence that the requirements of particular relationships could be objectively determined and empirically studied.

In fact, it may be necessary to employ both concepts of rules within the framework of Niebuhr's ethic, because, as Rawls himself acknowledges, not many moral situations are governed by "rules of practices." [19] Where such rules are not available, it may at least be useful to inquire into the concrete meaning of responsibility with the aid of the concrete wisdom embodied in the "summary rules." On the other hand, the "rules of practices" need to be set within the framework of a more comprehensive ethic, such as the one which Niebuhr provides, in view of the fact that in some situations particular rules of particular practices will impose conflicting claims on a single individual (or group), and the perspective of the comprehensive theory then will become necessary to resolve and accommodate the competing claims.

One's first impression is that an institution ethic with a well developed consciousness of "rules of practice" would be far more suitable to value education or moral education in the US Army than H. Richard Niebuhr's ethic of responsibility. The Army obviously is an institution, and a comprehensive and highly articulated one at that. Furthermore, it depends heavily on regularized procedures and on unambiguous relationships of com-

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[17] The problem is stated in Chapter One, "The Problem of Protestant Ethics Today," *War and the Christian Conscience* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961) and in many of Ramsey's other writings.

[18] See *Christ and Culture*, pp. 241–249.

[19] Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," p. 32, n. 27.

mand and obedience. Therefore, an ethic which places the highest premium on obedience and duty presumably should be most appropriate for this purpose, particularly in view of the fact that the institution under reference can draw on long and varied experience in defining concretely the relationships and limits of obedience and the content of duty.

But there are several important reasons why this ethic is not the most appropriate. Although the Army is a comprehensive institution and one in which obedience is highly important, it is not a totalitarian institution. Basic commitments of American society preclude that result. The soldier has an ambiguous status: he is a military instrument, but he is not merely a military instrument. He is a human person, and as a person is a subject of rights and a center of relationships that are not fully defined by nor comprehended within the military institution. He is not deprived of his basic rights as an American citizen by virtue of his being a member of the US Army, and because these rights relativize the claims which the Army is able to make on him, they place him in the position of requiring for his moral decisions an ethical theory more comprehensive than one which derives its behavioral directives from the institution. Moreover, the United States Constitution, bringing to expression basic values of the American people, denies even to the State itself—and therefore also to its military arm—the right to claim the ultimate loyalty and consequently the ultimate obedience of the citizen, whether in or out of military uniform. The moral education of the soldier must take full account of the implications of this relativization of obedience and "rules of practice" for both the institution and the soldier.

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the institution, we must acknowledge both that it can make justifiable claims on the individual member and that its claims are limited—by the rights of the soldier as person and citizen and by the State's recognition of the claims of a higher loyalty. Looking from the standpoint of the soldier, we must acknowledge that he has institutional obligations but that the whole of his obligation or responsibility is not defined by the institution. For example, he has responsibilities to family and friends which are neither shaped nor cancelled by the military institution even though his possibilities of fulfilling them may be heavily influenced by it. His moral self-understanding requires for its clarification and guidance, therefore, an ethical theory which transcends the limitations of an institutional ethic while yet including its insights in the contextual reality of the moral life.

A further problem for an "institution ethic" explicated in "rules of practice" is that it suggests a staticity of requirements and relationships which does not correspond to the apparent fluidity of requirements and relationships in American military institutions at this point in time. I must use the word *apparent*, because I view the military institutional situation as an outsider. Even an outsider, however, is not likely to be totally in error in his observation that there is a great deal of revision, adaptation, experimentation—expressing in part considerable intra-institutional uncertainty—in the internal goals and procedures of the US Armed Forces. This impression is confirmed by both the design of value (moral) education programs in the Army and the intense interest in improving the effectiveness of such programs shown by those who have prime responsibility for them.[20] What the outsider perceives is that in such a condition of fluidity, the moral education of neither the institution itself nor of its individual members can be guided solely or primarily by an institution ethic.

The responsiblist ethic, as we have seen, is able to comprehend in its delineations of responsibility and in its determinations of the situationally "fitting" response whatever is morally compelling in the institution ethic and the "rules of practice." Indeed, it requires their supplementation for those purposes. However, the responsiblist ethic is a comprehensive ethical theory, whereas the others are not. It is able to provide guidance not only for the revision of institutions and practices (with respect to their moral assessments) but also for the frequently encountered situations of conflict between claims of different institutions. More positively, and perhaps most importantly, it gives primacy to the moral category of responsibility. In doing so, it prevents the individual person from shifting the burden of decision completely to someone else—someone who is to decide what he is to do and then confront him with a command. Instead, it requires the individual to come to grips with the totality of challenges which confront him, to develop his capacity for analyzing and interpreting his own moral situation, to recognize with greater sensitivity the rights and reality of others, to shape creative decisions out of the welter of conflicting and confusing claims—in short, to mature in ways that finally can be expressed best by the various meanings of the word *responsible*.

III. Kohlberg's Moral Development Theory and Responsiblist Ethics

Although the primary emphasis of this article has been on the

[20] The open-ended nature of the continuing inquiry is clearly evident in Chaplain Gilbert's article, "Value Education."

comparative exposition of ethical theories, it may be of some value to introduce an educational theory in this final section in view of the fact that the primary concern of the project is with moral education. An educational theory will serve the dual purpose of giving a clearer view of the project itself and of showing the educational relevance of the particular ethical theory which has been advanced.

To serve these purposes I shall use the basic recommendations for moral education which Lawrence Kohlberg, the Harvard psychologist, has derived from his developmental psychological research.[21] Kohlberg's views are useful for several reasons. He believes that there is no fundamental incompatibility between moral education on the one hand and educational theory and psychology on the other. On the contrary, the educational process inevitably is a process in moral education even when such aims are explicitly rejected. Substitutes for moral education—*e.g.*, "social adjustment," "mental health"—simply conceal their value presuppositions. Moral education therefore is a possibility—a point made in opposition to the conclusions of earlier researchers such as Hartshorne and May.[22] However, the educational procedures cannot be those of didactic instruction, which Hartshorne and May and others have shown to be a failure, but must be based on developmental psychology.

Kohlberg's own findings, developed in the course of his dissertation research and expanded and applied in all his writings, are that moral development takes place through a series of three levels, each with two stages; a person may "fixate" at any moral level, but the process of development is irreversible. Moreover, although the content of moral expectations is culturally variable the process of development is not. The logic of the process of movement towards moral maturity is a universal characteristic of human nature.

The three levels of development are termed the "premoral," the level of "conventional role conformity," and the level of "self-accepted moral principles." The six stages, reduced to their simplest characterizations, are the following:

1. Obey to avoid punishment.
2. Obey to achieve rewards.
3. Conform to please others and to avoid disapproval.
4. Conform to conventional morality out of a sense of duty.

[21] Most of the exposition in this section is based on two articles: Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Development View," *The School Review*, 74 (Spring, 1966), pp. 1–30; and Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, "Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of Self in a Postconventional World," *Daedalus*, 100 (Fall, 1971), pp. 1051–1086.

[22] H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, *Studies in the Nature of Character*, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1928–1930).

5. Contract with others in a mutual recognition of rights and duties.

6. Act conscientiously, guided by universal moral principles.[23]

Only the third level—and the sixth stage in particular—according to Kohlberg, is moral action in the proper sense. Stage six is "moral maturity." Stages one and two are not really occasions of "moral action" in the proper sense, even though they involve conformity with moral expectations. The process as a whole is a process of moral development, and the goal of moral education obviously is to enable the person to arrive at the stage of self-determined moral judgment, *i.e.*, moral maturity. A very high percentage of adults never get beyond stage four. They must be regarded, therefore, as remaining in moral adolescence despite their ages.[24]

If we analyze the six stages in terms of Niebuhr's three types of ethical theory, we find that the first three stages are goal-oriented (obedience and conformity are instrumental modes of behavior prompted by concern for the consequences which they will produce), Stage four is an obedience or deontological ethic, and Stages five and six open the possibility for a responsiblist ethic. Stage six as defined is probably most congenial to an ethic of responsibility, but it is possible that the formation of conscience and the use of principles may be carried our under the conceptualization of a teleological (goal-oriented) or deontological (obedience) ethic.

Perhaps Kohlberg's views should have been studied also in the second section of this paper, for it is evident that he is arguing for a particular moral point of view and is not content to present the findings of psychological research. The obligation to move the person through all six stages of possible moral development is a moral commitment and not a psychological necessity. It is unlikely that a Prussian officer would want to move his soldiers beyond Stage four, and the same could be said for a medieval abbot whose monks had taken the vow of obedience. We might hypothesize further that those who argue for the "virtue of selfishness" would see no moral reason for carrying the process beyond Stage two. Kohlberg, of course, might very well accept these hypotheses and yet reject the proposal as it applies to his own position. One does not have to look very hard to see that he has laid new psychological foundations for a restatement of natural law morality. Nevertheless, as the other examples suggest, his moral commitment to move the individual all the way to Stage six is an inference drawn from his own

[23] For Kohlberg's own summary, see "Moral Education in the Schools," p. 7.

[24] Evidence on this point is presented in "Adolescent as a Philosopher."

convictions concerning the individual person as morally autonomous but socially responsible. It is enabled and supported by his psychological findings but not necessitated by them.

Kohlberg's scheme is useful in providing some insight into the nature and presuppositions of an inquiry into value or moral education in the US Army. If there were an unqualified, all-pervasive "Army line" (I refer to a moral stance, not to West Point football) the educational process would go no further than Stage four. The "line" would be orthodoxy, and deviation from it would be heresy or treason. The instructional method would be didactic, reinforced by persuasive sanctions. The very fact that this study can take place and proceed with its stated assumptions, goals and procedures, however, indicates that whatever "line" may exist is not that kind of orthodoxy. It indicates, moreover, that the initiators of the study have themselves passed beyond Stage four and doubtless intend that the process of education be redesigned to enable them to move their charges towards Stage six. If that is so, it may be for any combination of the following reasons: a) because they see no single "Army line," but rather a plurality of value and ethical orientations; b) because although they recognize the existence of an "Army line." at least in some quarters, they dissent from it, at least to some extent; c) because they recognize not only the pluralism of views but also the crisis (for example, in natural law) or dissolution of some that heretofore have been firm and authoritative; d) because their own confessional orientation requires that they maintain some tension between institutional commitments and an ultimate reference—divine law, will of God, covenant with God, *agape,* etc.; e) because they are committed to the principle of ultimate personal responsibility.

We must come finally to ask what correlation there can be between Kohlberg's moral education theory and Niebuhr's responsiblist ethics. I suggest the following three points: First, the ethic of responsibility, congruently supplemented by the other ethical theories, is an appropriate model for moral understanding and action at Stage six. In fact, it greatly strengthens Kohlberg's moral construct by replacing the "individual" with the "self."

Second, it is an appropriate and useful model for the moral education instructor who is endeavoring to help persons move toward moral maturity. By always raising the question "What is going on?" it sensitizes the teacher to discover the moral level of the student on the Kohlberg scale and to hear (Kohlberg insists that the teacher should listen carefully to the student) and interpret his moral language in the context of the stage

at which it is being used. By giving moral primacy to relationships of responsibility, it encourages the teacher to accept and respect the student at whatever stage he finds him. By asking after the "fitting" decision, it allows the teacher to attempt to move the student to the next stage, and does not tempt him to prod the student to leap all the way to Stage six.

Third, because the ethic of responsibility is a critical theory of morality, it does not permit either student or teacher to "fixate" at a stage lower than that of "moral maturity" (responsibility). This critical function is particularly important at Stage four, where the "conventional wisdom" carries the authority of community and tradition as well as of leaders and sanctions, and where the characteristic behavior is to accept the positive order as right in and of itself. The recognition of the relativity of all positive orders—which this ethic entails—and its constant insistence on sensitivity to all relationships of responsibility, including especially those that come off second best in a conflict of claims, inevitably establish a relationship of tension between the responsible self and the society or institution of which it is a member. However, as a "critical morality" the responsiblist ethic does not function simply to repudiate conventional moralities. Rather, it separates out and refines the moral wisdom and irreducible values of these conventional moralities and "converts" them to the wider contests of responsibility.

IV. Conclusion

To sum up: the best ethical theory for guiding value education or moral education in the United States Army is the responsiblist ethic of H. Richard Niebuhr. It stands out as an ethical theory because of its comprehensive grasp of moral experience, its particular phenomenology of moral decision-making, its sensitivity to the various dimensions of selfhood—relational, temporal, historical, natural.[25] It is suitable also for the process of moral education, as the correlation with Kohlberg's theory shows. Niebuhr's ethic is not sufficiently developed with respect to concrete criteria for determining the "fitting" decision, but it is open to combination with ethical theories which lend it greater specificity. The use of "institution ethics" and different types of "rule-ethics" is suggestive in this regard. Therefore, this ethical theory is eminently worthy of further and more intensive study as an instrument of the efforts of the US Army and its chaplains to understand and faithfully discharge their own responsibilities in the area of moral education.

[25] Similar categories are used in Richard L. Means, *The Ethical Imperative*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969).

ON THEORETICAL EGOCENTRISM AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE

Robert Hogan, Ph. D.

The purpose of this article is to try to gain some perspective on contemporary attitudes toward the topic of socialization and the problem of compliance. The discussion proceeds by contrasting two theoretical perspectives on the nature of social conduct—the Hobbesian individualism of contemporary psychology and an alternative, role-theroretical perspective.

American social psychology, particularly in its study of moral attitudes and conduct, can be plausibly described as theoretically egocentric, *i.e.*, as wedded to a particular theoretical perspective. There is reason to believe, moreover, that this single viewpoint is isomorphic with, or closely reflects the dominant themes of, American political thought. To the degree that this is true, social psychology takes on the characteristics of what Karl Mannheim called an ideology.[1] Certain obvious parallels between social psychological theory and American political thought come readily to mind. Consider, for example, the dogma of the American "melting pot," which denies the validity of ethnic and cultural differences; consider also the philosophy of the old West, namely, that institutionalized concepts of law and justice (which emanate from the decadent East) are generally inappropriate to life on the frontier; consider finally the fact that the dominant temper of our political institutions is English. In a manner perfectly consistent with these themes, American social psychology seems to have adopted a "Hobbesian world view." [2] On this view, societies are composed of aggregates of discrete individuals, each following his own enlightened and rational self-interest. Social institutions (as embodied in law, custom and tradition) seriously, and sometimes even pathologically, restrict individual freedom; they are at best necessary evils, whose only justification lies in their power to regulate social affairs.

The Hobbesian perspective seems naturally to lead to two

[1] *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936).

[2] Cf. Theodore Mischel, "Scientific and Philosophical Psychology: A Historical Introduction," in Theodore Mischel, ed., *Human Action: Conceptual and Emperical Issues* (New York: Academic Press, 1969), p. 5.

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conclusions. First, tradition, custom and historically sanctioned modes of thought and behavior are always expendable and often pernicious (witness, for example, Henry Ford's apocalyptic and quintessentially American remark that history is bunk). Second, compliance with social norms and rules is a form of arrested development, a tendency which the mature person will somehow transcend.

To make this discussion more specific, Freud (reflecting a Hobbesian perspective) explained moral development in exclusively intrapsychic terms; his account can be described in terms of three stages. First, one must master his innate, implacably antisocial, instinctual tendencies and, in so doing, internalize the rules and values of parents and society. This produces the psychic institution of a conscience or superego. Second, in adulthood one gradually substitutes the flexible administration of a realistic ego for the unyielding moralistic demands of one's superego. Finally, the most mature person is characterized by a rational alienation from all public enthusiasms and a carefully cultivated individuality. In the Freudian model, to the degree that one has a conscience he is neurotic; neurosis, however, is precisely the price one must pay for the benefits of living in society.

The anti-moral tendencies of psychoanalysis are well-known and obvious. The same tendencies, however, are latent in several other areas of psychology. Existentialism, for example, which provides the basis for the writings of R. D. Laing, Fritz Perls, Carl Rogers, and Rollo May, maintains that to the degree that one has identified with his social roles, he is self-deceived and lives in bad faith. Authentic existence and self-actualization require distance and detachment from one's customary roles and interaction patterns. Thus, like psychoanalysis, existentialism regards conventional socialization as something to be overcome.

In developmental psychology, Kohlberg[3] argues that the moral reasoning which supports moral conduct passes through six relatively well-defined, invariant stages, each of which replaces the earlier, less mature stages, and each of which represents a higher and more moral form of thought. At the third of Kohlberg's stages, moral conduct consists of conforming to the expectations of others; at the fourth level it entails endorsing the traditional sources of social and religious authority of one's culture. At the fifth level, morality involves a respect for law and the legally defined rights of others. At the sixth and most moral stage, social sanctions, traditional sources of authority, and legal obligations become relatively unimportant—the most moral person transcends

[3] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientation Towards a Moral Order," *Vita Humana*, 1963, 6, pp. 11–33.

these considerations and acts on the basis of personally defined, *individual principles of conscience.*

Finally, a series of experiments in social psychology supports the critique of normal socialization implicit in psychoanalysis, existentialism, and Kohlberg's research in moral development. Thus, the classic studies by Asch [4] and Milgram [5] are routinely interpreted as showing how conformity to group standards or the demands of conventional authority may cause one to violate the otherwise more compelling norms of intellectual integrity and respect for the welfare of others. Recently, Zimbardo has demonstrated that compliance with externally assigned roles can produce shocking transformations in personality and dangerously dehumanizing attitudes toward one's peers. The lesson to be drawn from all the foregoing considerations is clear—one must be constantly on guard against complying with the demands of a misguided group or corrupt authority. What is also clear but less frequently reflected on is that this attitude is perfectly compatible with 360 years of American political history.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE HOBBESIAN WORLD VIEW

There are four consequences of the Hobbesian world view which should be spelled out; two are pragmatic-empirical and two are more broadly social. First, from this Hobbesian perspective the primary question in socialization research is, what must be done to the natural tendencies of a child in order to fit him to the Procrustean bed of society? What unnatural and alien attitudes and responses must be pumped into children, how must they be transformed, in order to bring them into step with the remainder of their society? As we shall see below, this question can be phrased in alternative and possibly more productive ways.

A second and related consequence of the Hobbesian perspective concerns strategies for rehabilitating delinquents. From the individualistic perspective of American psychology, this consists of various forms of one-on-one psychotherapy, periodically supplemented with group counseling, all designed to change intrapsychic structures. Major therapeutic goals include aiding the delinquent in working through his unresolved Oedipal strivings, causing him to see that his behavior is self-defeating and nonproductive, giving him insight into the origins of his deviant impulses. Obviously I believe there are alternatives to this strategy as well.

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[4] Solomon E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity," *Psychological Monographs*, 1956, 70 (9, Whole No. 416).

[5] Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1963, 67, pp. 371–378.

A third consequence of the Hobbesian perspective is an impoverished sense of professionalism among psychologists themselves. Professionalism, as exemplified in activities as diverse as athletics, soldiering, and science, can be defined as pride in the traditions of an avocation or occupation, as the realization that one's performance will be evaluated in terms of a set of somewhat arbitrary standards to whose discipline one freely submits himself, and the feeling that one's merit depends on how well he meets these standards. As evidence of the minimal sense of professionalism in psychology, I offer the following example, which I have found to be a relatively common experience. I interviewed a new Ph.D. for a position as a clinical psychologist in our department. She was very bright and ambitious, had attended the best undergraduate and graduate institutions, and had received superb letters of recommendation from well-known men in her field. Yet, as the young woman cheerfully acknowledged, she knew nothing about the use of the MMPI, The Rorschach, nor indeed, about the entire subject of personality assessment. Moreover, she disclaimed any knowledge of psychoanalysis or developmental psychology as exemplified in Piaget's writings—despite the fact that her specialty was the behavior disorders of childhood. Her education, it seems, was up-to-date; personality assessment, psychoanalysis, and Piaget were part of history and therefore bunk.

Finally, the more general phenomenon which the biologist Garret Hardin refers to as the "tragedy of the commons" seems to be a direct consequence of our Hobbesian social philosophy. The tragedy of the commons refers to the situation in which a community has a common pasture wherein all its members permit their cattle to graze. While there is not enough grass to support all the cattle, if any one person voluntarily refrains from using the commons he puts himself at a serious economic disadvantage. Thus, when each person quite reasonably pursues his own self-interest, the result is a degredation of the total environment. If Hardin's analysis is correct (as it certainly seems to be), then our theoretical egocentrism may ultimately be, in a very real sense, the ruin of us all.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLE THEORY

I would now like to describe an alternative to the Hobbesian perspective, which might be called psychological role theory, and explore some of its implications. The assumptions underlying this discussion are, briefly, that man is fundamentally a social animal whose well-being requires both social interaction *and* predictability in his daily affairs, and that cultural and social

institutions are projections of these two aspects of human nature. Moreover, these institutions, far from being necessary evils, often give form and meaning to individual lives. That is, the sense of belonging to a group or community gives life purpose and direction; the sense of participation in a historically sanctioned enterprise is an essential aspect of psychological health. Finally, to the degree that people exclusively pursue their enlightened self-interest, they and their societies are sick.

Three different sets of considerations support these assumptions. The first comes from anthropology, where the consensus of recent opinion is that Homo Sapiens evolved as a hunter.[6] For the largest portion of our existence as a species we lived in small hunting bands, and each band was organized to kill game and members of competing bands as efficiently as possible. Thus, human society throughout prehistory consisted of small groups literally struggling for survival, and that which promoted survival was the quality of the group rather than the accomplishments of discrete individuals. Specifically, an immediate adaptive advantage was conferred on those groups which developed an efficient social organization, defined in terms of leadership structure, division of labor, communication systems, transmission of knowledge, etc. Reasoning of this sort leads to two conclusions: first, culture or social organization rather than brain size is the key to man's evolutionary success; and second, the individualism sanctified by the Hobbesian perspective is probably an inaccurate reflection of man's biological nature. Rather, man seems to have evolved as a group-living, culture-bearing, norm-respecting animal whose survival was closely tied to his social institutions.

A second source of support for the assumptions underlying psychological role theory comes from Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of contemporary sociology. In *L'Education Morale*, a book somewhat ignored by psychologists, Durkheim accounts for moral development in social (as contrasted with intrapsychic) terms; his discussion may be outlined in terms of three steps. The first stage in moral development consists of acquiring a deep sense of respect for the rules and values of one's society; those who are undisciplined by the law are, according to Durkheim, morally incomplete. Second, one must orient his actions to impersonal ends; this can only come about by identifying with (or becoming a member of) the various social groups with which one is associated. Third, one must become aware of the reasons for his actions; at this point, Durkheim argues, one's moral

[6] Cf. Ernst Mayr, *Populations, Species, and Evaluation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1970) and Sherwood L. Washburn, ed., *Social Life of Early Man* (London: Metheu, 1962).

conduct—defined as actions in accordance with group goals—becomes autonomous, independent of external sanctions. Durkheim would almost surely maintain that the gradual collapse of our social institutions—including most importantly the family—has produced the anomie, loss of identity, alienation, alcoholism, drug addiction, delinquency and suicide that seems to characterize modern society. Moreover, the current interest of young people in communes, old movies, encounter groups, folk music, art, handicrafts and ethnic traditions seems to reflect a spontaneous repudiation of the Hobbesian perspective, which repudiation Durkheim might also have predicted.

The third line of evidence supporting the assumptions underlying the role theoretical viewpoint comes from a series of investigations conducted by some of my colleagues and me at Johns Hopkins. If man does indeed by nature seek social interaction within a structured framework, then these tendencies should appear quite early. Stayton, Hogan and Ainsworth,[7] in a study of the origins of socialization, found that, given a properly warm and supporting environment, infants in the 9 to 12 month age range spontaneously comply with maternal commands. This suggests that children may come into the world preprogrammed to accept a wide variety of seemingly arbitrary rules, including those which govern social interaction as well as speech, dress and dietary customs [8]. Garvey and Hogan [9] found that when pairs of 3 1/2 to 5 year olds play together, a majority of their speech and nonverbal behavior is mutually adaptive, reflecting sensitivity to and concern with the motives and behavior of others. Moreover, even the youngest of these children demonstrated a remarkable command of conventional (in both senses of the word) and therefore rule-governed, ploys to initiate and sustain interaction. Grief,[10] in an examination of sex role acquisition from a role-theoretical perspective, found that pre-Oedipal children (*i.e.*, 3 1/2 to 5 years old) are able competently to use a variety of socially defined roles—daddy, sister, etc.—as vehicles for social interaction. Moreover, these children became noticeably upset if one of their members persistently violated standard role expectations. Finally, Garvey [11] suggests that children find the use of conventional roles and other interpersonal strategems

[7] "Infant Obedience and Maternal Behavior: The Origins of Socialization Reconsidered," *Child Development*, 1971, 42, pp. 1057–1069.

[8] Cf. Conrad H. Waddington, *The Ethical Arrival* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[9] Catherine Garvey and Robert Hogan, "Social Speech and Social Interaction: Egocentrism Revisited," *Child Development* (in press).

[10] Esther Grief, "Sex-role Playing in Preschool Children," Paper presented at Eastern Psychological Association, May, 1973.

[11] Catherine Garvey, "Some Properties of Social Play," unpublished manuscript, The Johns Hopkins University, June, 1973.

rewarding in two ways: first, such devices facilitate and intensify social interaction far beyond the level maintained by parallel play; and second, they afford children a measure of control over the responses of their counter-players, which control seems intrinsically satisfying to exercise.

Taken together, these considerations suggest that children are sociocentric, possibly from birth and certainly by the end of the first year of life. As a consequence, they actively seek social interaction. They also develop very rapidly a considerable repertoire of conventional, rule-governed means for initiating and sustaining this interaction. Moreover, the means themselves, the formalized procedures in terms of which interaction proceeds, quickly (*e.g.*, at least within the first 3 1/2 years of life) become valued for their own sake. For many young children, proper observance of the rules of conduct becomes literally more important than the interaction which the rules structure and support; that is, some children will end an interaction rather than tolerate a violation of the rules of the social game.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ROLE-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The consequences of this role-theoretical perspective contrast markedly with the consequences of the Hobbesian perspective of American social psychology, which were outlined above. Four of these contrasts might be mentioned. First, the primary problem in socialization research is not how to transform children so that they will fit into society. Rather, given the apparently innate willingness of children to comply with adult authority, the primary question is, what must be done to the fundamentally sociocentric child to alienate him from his social group and community? In direct contrast with psychoanalysis, conformity becomes a nonproblem if a child is reared in a reasonably benign social environment. Conversely, hostile and egocentric behavior becomes a sign of pathology rather than the natural concommitant of unspoiled innocence.

Second, from this perspective the strategy for rehabilitating delinquents would be social rather than individual. Delinquents must first form attachments to the members of a group or set of groups; this is the most difficult step in the rehabilitation process. Next, they must come to regard the continued existence of the group as important. Finally, they must believe that the welfare and continued existence of the group is in some way tied to their actions. These requirements may be rephrased as follows. A delinquent must discover a person or set of persons, who represent(s) a viable cultural group, whose approval matters to him.

Then he must realize that this approval is dependent upon his performance in accordance with the standards of the group. To make this very specific, delinquents must experience a form of irrational or religious conversion to a belief in the standards of an organic and functioning social group or entity. This, very briefly, is the secret to the success of such groups as the Marine Corps, Alcoholics Anonymous, the Synanon Foundation, and, apparently, the Black Muslims, all of which have shown some success in treating certified delinquents.

A third consequence of this role-theoretical perspective bears on the subject of professionalism among psychologists. There are at least two discernable motives for professionalism, which we defined earlier as a willingness to comply with and defend the conventional evaluative standards of an organized group, and to feel badly if these norms are violated. The first motive is a slavish form of devotion to authority that characterizes all true believers to which Piaget gave the name "moral realism." [12] This is a disagreeable form of zealotry abhorrent to any thoughtful person. The second source of professionalism stems from a realization that, in the final analysis, all human action is arbitrary, that rules and standards are an important means by which we can impose order on social chaos, and that authentic existence and human excellence can *only* be defined in terms of these standards. The author of Ecclesiastes admirably expressed the spirit of this form of professionalism when he wrote: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might; for there is no work, no device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom; in the grave, whither thou goest." In another statement of this existential form of professionalism, Camus' *Myth of Sisyphus* also argues that a person's worth may be defined in terms of how one bears up under seemingly pointless constraints. Thus, competent fulfillment of arbitrary standards of excellence may give a peculiarly *human* dignity and meaning to our lives.

Finally, and in agreement with Durkheim, from this role-theoretical perspective, the ideology of individualism and the personal conscience orientation that characterizes American social psychology is symptomatic of a sick society. What appears to be a gradual erosion of traditional American culture—in all its ethnic diversity—has produced alienation, rising crime rates, and Garret Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. It seems to me that the ambivalent perspective of many social psychologists toward the topic of socialization and the problem of compliance both reflects and contributes to this general erosion of confidence in our civilization. As one possible response, I would like to close by men-

[12] Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

tioning three points which we all know but some of us may have forgotten. First, a firm and enduring set of cultural traditions is both the key to man's survival and necessary for his psychic well-being. When the socialization process begins to break down, societies become unstable and the quality of life for each individual is endangered. Second, compliance with the dictates of tradition and ostensibly legitimate authority is *not* pathological; it is a psychological process as normal and necessary as digestion and respiration. Third, it is important always to maintain the distinction between cultural institutions and individual exemplars of these institutions. Thus, as Edmund Burke noted, there is often some rough wisdom and functional justification for institutions that have passed the test of time. However, it is always legitimate to suspect the motives and intentions of individual political leaders and figures of authority. For, as Freud noted repeatedly in his later writings, these people tend to be narcissistic, egocentric and ruthless. They are concerned primarily with power and their regard for their followers is directly proportional to the followers' perceived utility for the leader's career. Finally, to confound or deny the distinction between the legitimate institutions of a society and its political leadership is the perception of a zealot.

THE LIFE GOOD TO LIVE: A PSYCHO-ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Peter A. Bertocci, Ph.D.

The ferment that has characterized the lives of so many young people, especially in the last decade, stems from two not unrelated questions: Why should I accept the authority of anyone for *my* life? What makes a life worth living? I believe there is an answer to both questions and in what follows I hope to show what the approach to the answer should be.

I. THE GROUND-RULES FOR SELF-DISCOVERY

I am making three assumptions. First, while the two questions seem rebellious, they are nevertheless reasonable, as the age-long experience of man shows. A reasoned question deserves a reasoned answer. Persons, young and old, often throw stones because they are given stones when they ask for bread. My answers to these basic questions will not be logically coercive, but they will arise from the yeast and dough of our human experience.

My second assumption is itself based on an undeniable fact of human experience. No man is an island. He is born into a family; in his infancy and early years he could not even survive unless his family was related to other families that, in turn, were linked to each other by understandings, customs, and laws that, in turn, enabled them to know what they could depend on and expect. Since every person and every family has more wants and needs than their own abilities can fulfill, especially in an environment that is not always generous to their stage of development, the question never is: Can we fulfill our natures without agreements and laws? It is: What agreements and laws must we rely upon if we are to live with each other?

Since we as persons are ever in competition, and since we make mistakes in judging, it is basic to any hope of fair play for each of us to live by my third assumption: A person is innocent of another person's accusations until he is "proven" guilty by relatively impartial judges. This means that a person is not to be used or abused by an accuser simply because the accuser has more power. Power and might are not to be scorned in human

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affairs, but might by itself never makes right, either in the individual or in society.

These three assumptions for this essay are themselves rooted in our human experience. Taken together they support the approach I shall use in exploring the nature of the life good to live. In essence, the life good to live is not to be imposed upon persons either in the name of God or the State, the family, an ethnic group, a social class or personal privilege. We must look for authority—for what so many call "being authentic"—in the life of persons as they examine the relationship of their needs and abilities, as they *reason* together, in their environment. To reason about life is not to take the stuffing out of life but to leave it there and to see what happens when we examine its effects on individuals both by themselves and in community.

All this may seem "quite understandable" and less than "demanding." But it bites into unexamined assumptions when I translate my assumptions into the basic premise of this essay: *No one experience, no one desire or need, no one ability or capacity is to be given privileged status, or dictate to any other without further criticism, or without coming before the bench of the rest of our experiences. No experience is guilty unless proven so; but neither is it necessarily innocent.* Experiences, like people, live with each other in an environment that is far from neutral to what persons do. "Come, let us reason together," is the source of authority. But that authority is itself derived ultimately from the fact that, in relating what we are as persons to ourselves and to each other, we ask that we protect ourselves against bias as much as possible by giving no experience and no person arbitrary *authority* (or *authoritarian* power). In a word, reason has authority because it says to each person: Take all of your own potential into account as you make choices, but remember that other persons deserve the same consideration, until you can show that they do not and that you or they deserve to be exceptions.

We must dismiss as inadequate at least one widely held affirmation. It is that a person will "find himself" and become "authentic" by looking to his feelings, his needs or wants, his emotions. I am not suggesting that feelings and emotions be neglected. But I deny that a person at any stage of life—and least of all in childhood and early or late adolescence—can find himself by looking only to his feelings and emotions for guidance. For one thing, feelings and emotions are much more varied than children and adolescents realize. Since they lack breadth of experience, it is understandable that young people are tempted to give their feelings and desires such prominence. But as they themselves soon find out, their feelings and emotions must be acted out by

their abilities—in an environment that often makes unalterable demands. The tragedy of many lives is not that they suppress or repress feelings but that they cannot express, suppress or repress them in accordance with their *total* potential as persons. *Do what you can,* therefore, is likely to be a safer guide than *do only what you want,* or *do what you are interested in.* As I say, it is understandable that one who does not yet know what he *can* do is likely to be guided by "interest." But this does not make it right. The more a person experiences, the more he faces the reality of *all* of his own nature and of his varied world. The "reality principle," and the *art of the possible (given his own growth-point),* is a better guide to planning and action.

Most lives are not destroyed by a conflict with "society"—lives are weakened by their own inner conflicts. People want (or need) more than they can achieve, and their anxiety and frustration is the greater because they refuse to cut the cloth of their lives to fit both their feelings, their wants, their emotions *and* their abilities to the promise of their achievements. For example, no amount of "understanding" emotions will fill the vacuum left by an inability to read or the lack of even the lowliest skill that will make a person dependable in some area.

We have already gone far toward answering the first question about the source of authority in one's life. The source of authority (not the same as the source of power) is in one's life as a whole, and in his life as dependent upon and affecting the lives of others. The source of authority is self-imposed by the person reasoning about the dynamics of his own life, but without disregarding the dynamics of the reasoning of other persons. Reason does not impose on life from outside of life; reason is the person trying to see what connections, what network, there may be in the growth of his own potential and that of others in this kind of world. This answer is far from complete; no one should accept it unless his reasoning can now discover values that define the life good to live.

II. VALUES AS THE EXPERIENCES OF PERSONS

I shall answer the second question, namely, What makes a life worth living? by showing that there is *a pattern* of values to be discovered, not one or two isolated values. This discovery can be made by keeping in mind all the phases of our being as persons and by asking how they are related to each other. Since we as persons have to decide which relations among values will encourage an optimum harmony, it is we as persons who can decide whether the patterning of values to be suggested will indeed be

mutually supportive and probably result in a minimum of fruitless conflict.

It goes almost without saying that no one can live simply by the maxim: I want what I want when I want it. Again two realistic facts confront such a demand: One is that none of us, within his own life, can live without being in conflict, without any frustration, anxiety or suffering. Something must be given up. To discover our potential inevitably means prolonging the hallway of desires and sacrificing some values for the promise of others. Hence, the only real question persons face is not: Will I be in conflict? but: What conflict will be worthwhile? Or, better: What conflict, if accepted, what sacrifice, if made, will ensure the optimum values in my own life and in my life with others?

I shall now proceed first by defining briefly what I mean by "value" and then go on to show that values in the experience of persons, once examined, do reveal a very significant pattern that I choose to call a "symphony of values."

A value is always an experience of a person: "value" is a term used when a person refers to *an experience he wants* ("disvalue" to an experience he does not want). What is valued (or disvalued) is always an experiencing, the experiencing of eating a pear, the experiencing of hearing Bach, the experiencing of friendliness. "Value" and "disvalue," in other words, refer to some personal undergoing, to some personal *Erlebnis;* no person equals no values or disvalues. To ask persons to live valuable lives is to ask them to *experience* values—and possible disvalues—in their own growth, change and interaction with others and with the environment.

The experiencing of value, however, is not the evaluation of the experiencing. When we *evaluate* we are analyzing and relating immediate value-experiences to each other. In other words, in human experience we never start in a value-vacuum, from zero value-experience, as it were. We do not begin evaluating by some point of reference beyond the value-experiences themselves. Evaluating finds us already predisposed toward some values and value patterns. This contention, debatable to be sure, is basic: before we start reflecting about value-experience, before we start purposeful evaluation, our psycho-physiological natures have already been in the business of reaching for, preserving and avoiding some experiences and not others.[1] Accordingly, we do not, when we evaluate, create the value-experiencings; we ask questions

[1] This view of value is very ably set forth in Ralph Burton Perry's *Realm of Values: A Critique of Human Civilization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Edgar S. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, reprinted by Kraus Reprints (1968); F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928); and Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1961).

about them from within our experience simply because we find that the value-experiencings have different qualities, that they conflict with each other, or converge with each other.

Thus, when we evaluate we consider the dynamics of the interrelations between value-experiences—not only in terms of their felt-qualities, or patterns of felt-qualities, but in relation to their mutual support or nonsupport, both in ourselves and others. For example, a man may enjoy the taste-quality of a certain brand of cigarette and the sociality of smoking with other persons. Let us assume, on the one hand, that he now comes to enjoy the quality "smoking-a-cool-cigarette" without decreasing the sociability, although he still prefers Camels. On the other hand, he finds that he does not enjoy the image of himself as a chain-smoker, and he gains no comfort from statistics about the relation of cigarette smoking to serious diseases. If another cigarette were developed that did not yield the same immediate quality of enjoyment (for instance, did not taste so good) but did not endanger health, he might switch to this new brand. His analysis, note, is of actual experiences and of foreseeable consequences for further experiences of value.

Thus, any value-pattern we discover will be a description about man in his world, or of the world *with man left in it.* The ideal of the life good to live will be a consequence of man's relating himself in thought and action to his own nature and to his total environment. Values and value-patterns are experiences of man; they *relate* him to his world. To say this is not to court relativism in value-theory, for man's value-patterns are not the product of his whims or desires, but joint-products of his nature (actual and potential) in interaction with the total nurturant environment. Given the limits of man's potential and of his environment, there simply is no denying that some value-experiences are preferable to others, not only *prima facie,* but also by virtue of the fact that if one chooses them, he is not endangering but supporting and enhancing others. It is this clue that will be elaborated as we begin our systematic search for a pattern of values that defines what life is worth living.

III. EXISTENCE, HEALTH AND TRUTH VALUES

Persons prefer life to death. There would be no problem about the ethics of suicide, murder or immorality were this not so. Being alive and staying alive is the necessary but not sufficient condition for all other values. Yet to be alive, to exist, is already to be engaged in enjoying or suffering value-and-disvalue-experiences. Our question, then, is: What values are mutually enhancing and sustaining? For a human being who can be

aware of himself, who can remember and plan, "the purpose of life," as Socrates said, "is not to live but to live well." The question for persons is not "to be or not to be"; even Hamlet raised it in the context of what he should do about the heinous injustice done to his father and his own disappointment with deceit and infidelity.

The moment a person *decides* to live he faces the problem of living as a healthy body. *Physiological health* is more than sheer survival. But he no sooner decides to pursue health than he realizes that both survival and health depend on other values. Health-values not only enhance the likelihood of survival but they lend quality and vigor to day-to-day existence. Indeed, persons face not only the problem of living longer and in physical health, but also, as many healthy, retired senior citizens know all too well, the problem of having so little to live for, given bodily health. The fact is that quiet, "genteel" abortions of *quality in life* can take place when persons "are retired" and endure lives that are empty of so many of the values that could give substance, purpose and dignity to their existence.

The patterning of values forces itself upon us, then, the moment we say we prefer physiological health to mere survival. We then need to *know* about our bodies and the many factors that affect health. Health values depend upon other values. Nobody can have and assure even health-values without the value of truth, pursued by himself and others—and this pursuit often endangers both existence and health.

Truth-values include all the values involved in searching for and discovering what the nature of man is in relation to his total environment. I cannot stop to explore the horizon of values, including moral virtues, that are involved here. Honesty, the virtue of *conveying* the truth; courage, the willingness to risk discovering and living by whatever truth we have; and tolerance, the willingness to endure the explorations and affirmations of those who disagree with one's own convictions—such moral strengths are too readily taken for granted when we realize that the healthiest person may be destroyed by his own and others' human ignorance of some survival-relationships between man and his world.

It is persons like Socrates who help us to see that truth-finding can cost a life. He drank the hemlock because he taught that the unexamined life was not worth living. Socrates did more than deny that "a man, after all, has to live!" Without the search for as much wisdom (more than information!) as possible, a man is not a man; for a man who does not search for wisdom never faces the fundamental fact that truth, the value upon

which all other quality in values depends, is what gives uniqueness to his self-consciousness. It is worth mentioning, in passing, that in the last analysis the reason for allowing some persons exemption from the danger of war so that they can continue their schooling is the realization that a state depends for the quality of its existence upon those who engage in the discipline of discovering, preserving, teaching and applying such truths as we have.

But, as I have already hinted, truth is not simply an instrument to other values. Socrates would have been the first to defend the search for truth by saying that the actual experience of sensitive knowing (from perception, through empirical generalization, to abstract reasoning and speculation) has a quality *as* experienced that is preferable to physical health as such. Who would prefer to be a healthy idiot, a moron or an uninformed and dull person rather than a curious, problem-posing, problem-solving, reflective person? To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, it is better to be Socrates unsatisfied than a healthy person who has no experience of thinking and truth-seeking. Even if these contentions about the intrinsic value of the search for wisdom were questionable, we cannot escape the fact that healthy persons depend on the person whose life is not only healthy but aware of truths relevant to protecting health, and on the society that encourages and does not penalize truth-seekers.

To summarize: we have already discovered that while value-experiences such as existence, health and truth-values are different from each other qualitatively, they do not exist in separate compartments; they are mutually related or interpenetrating phases in the experience of persons. *One cannot exist as a person without seeking health and truth both for their own sakes and for each other. We know this by observing the qualities of the experiences themselves and the causal web within which they exist.* Each supports the other and furthers the other, and each could be used to destroy the possibility of the other. Value-experiences in persons are not unstructured ecstasies; our lives, at any level, cannot be a chaos of leaves that winds of impulse and desire drive hither and yonder. To live at all is to live in connections we can't escape; our problem is to discover the pattern of connections among our value and disvalue experiences.

IV. TRUTH-VALUES AND CHARACTER-VALUES

I have already suggested that the moment we note that truth and health are interrelated in our experience, that same realization requires that we note other ties between our value-experiences. We have been talking as if existence and a modicum

of health were the only conditions for truth-finding, and as if "knowledge is virtue." But because we don't find truth under a stone, or in a book, we realize that even information, let alone broad wisdom, comes only to persons who are willing to discipline themselves. The fact is that knowledge by itself is not virtue, although it is impossible without virtue. At the same time, as I shall soon suggest, virtue without knowledge of fact and values can yield nothing but self-serving fanaticism.

A person's willingness to discipline himself by his ideals is what we have in mind when we refer to his *character*. While we use one word *character* for self-disciplined persons, inspection again reveals that a person's character does not exist apart from the forms of self-discipline that we call the moral *virtues*. One doesn't set out to build character; he builds into his life such traits as honesty, courage, kindness, gratitude, meekness and tolerance, among others.[2]

We can immediately see the relevance of traits of character both to health and to truth-values, as well as to every other value in the pattern we shall find. There are boulders and potholes on the road to truth. For example, our craving for "gratification-now" allows us to avoid knowing what is within our grasp; we postpone the beginning of better eating habits and bodily regimen by rationalizing. At such choice points, merely improving the environment and social services does not solve the problem. One can provide another with free medical aid, one can see to it that food and housing is adequate for him, but one cannot supply another with the self-discipline he needs in order to avail himself of these goods even if they are within his reach. For so many human beings the problem of health is not the problem of knowledge but the problem of acquiring character-traits. Knowledge and health aids are available; what is lacking is what only these persons themselves can provide—self-discipline. As I have hinted, *virtue is knowledge*; not *knowledge is virtue*.

It might seem that I am about to crusade against "permissiveness," and to set the flexing of moral muscle against understanding persons and their emotions. Actually I am concerned to focus on the fact that personal creativity, confidence in one's own ability to put up with pain, with conflict (especially when it can be avoided) is the basis of confidence. Again, the realities of living together must be faced. The person who wants to be authentic must realize that others who disagree with him also want to be authentic. Conscientious objectors have a way of thinking that there are no conscientious believers and vice versa. Persons

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[2] See P. A. Bertocci and R. M. Millard, *Personality and the Good* (New York: David McKay, 1963), Chapters 16, 17.

who fight against "conforming" want others to conform to them. Life itself speaks for much more than conformity or nonconformity; it resists anyone who thinks that in "doing his thing" others who disagree with him—as they "do their thing"—should pat him on the back. To live with others is to cost them some of their "identity"—we ask others not to "identify" in such a way that leaves us out of their search for identity. Unless a person accepts the fact of frustration, of anxiety, and realizes that both he and others must discipline themselves in various ways, there will be no mutual trust. Too many persons are so interested in finding themselves that they never see anybody else and his frustrations, anxieties *and* hopes. In short, character-traits are born of the realization that each of us needs to know that he can face physical, psychological and spiritual frustration and anxiety.

Consider two more applications of the need for character. Persons equally concerned about the truth may jealously throw roadblocks in the way of any one truth-seeker; they pile scorn upon him and they add to his need to discipline himself by his own ideal of truth. We often underestimate how much the freedom of any one scholar and inventor is dependent on the tolerance of others, and especially on the forbearance of equally learned scholars. Truth-seeking calls for social self-discipline, for a sense of humor and deep-rooted humility on the part of both truth-finder and of the community in which he lives. In short, the discovery of truth presupposes sufficient individual freedom of will on the part of the scholar as he disciplines himself by ideals of evidence and not by wishes; it also presupposes sufficient social and political tolerance to enable him to pursue that course. At the same time, he who pursues the truth must be willing to be censured and to be criticized; he cannot proceed unless he has the will to discipline himself within the total context of social and political freedom.

A second application: All of us delegate responsibility to others for the common good. I am thinking particularly of every person who, under oath, must at times set aside values of his own that conflict with his chosen responsibilities. I mean here everybody from the policeman to the lawyer, judge, teacher, politician and soldier. Indeed, the uniform—be it that of the policeman, the judge, the doctor or the lawyer—means that the person in uniform is willing to set aside personal opinions and personal values when they lead to action conflicting with the code of his profession and the law of the land. For example, the doctor may hate the wounded person who tried to kill the President; the doctor's duty is to save his life as well as that of the President. Again,

the officer of the law may dislike the law he must enforce: we expect him to discipline himself and disregard his personal opinion when obscenities are hurled at him.

There can be no civility, let alone any movement to justice, unless all realize that character-values grow as persons forego values they might otherwise enjoy. In these different ways of self-discipline is moral creativity to be found. Character, in a word, is the creative core of all the values, and none will be sustained and developed without character-traits. We can understand why Kant said: "Nothing in the world—indeed nothing even beyond the world—can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will! Kant saw that the good will is "the indispensable condition of even worthiness to be happy," as well as the condition for the development of other values. And with unerring insight he also saw that the experience of good will, "the summoning of all the means in our power" to do what seems best, "would sparkle like a jewel with its own light as something that had its full worth in itself.[3]

But granted that character is the moral crucible for the creation and sustaining of other values, it is not enough. I repeat, *conscientiousness is not enough.* The willingness to die for what he believes to be right can destroy both oneself and others. The persons who abduct and kill hostages, if necessary, knowing that they may have to forfeit their own lives in the process, are fanatics or martyrs—depending on the perspective of what ends are being served. In our own day, as in others, the fact remains: character without other values is blind; other values without character are threatened with early death, if they are born at all. Again, moral creativity without the guidance of value-patterns are not only empty but very dangerous; and yet, value-patterns never are created or sustained without the moral creativity that character involves.

V. TRUTH, CHARACTER AND AFFILIATIVE VALUES

Consider what we would have before us if a personality is strong in the value of health, truth and character, but is very weak in the value of *affiliation.* (I purposely do not say *love,* since I reserve the word "love" for a total style of life and not for one type of value.) By *affiliation* I mean the capacity to be responsive to the needs and wants of others and to enter into non-parasitic, appreciative relationships. The person who cannot emotionally care about anyone else, who treats *persons* as if they were as incapable of response to him as *things* are, who finds

[3] *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* First Section, Lewis W. Beck, ed. and tr., *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 55–56.

that he cannot willingly accept any responsibility for other persons—that person may have physical health, he may be strong-willed, and he may enjoy his lonely search for truth, but he is a poverty-stricken human being. It was the psychologist of personality, Gordon W. Allport, who emphasized that the normal development of a mature personality involved the movement from dependence to independence to dependability.

Here again, if we knew nothing else about the psychology of personality and the nature of persons, we should be justified in asking psychologists and philosophers to keep in mind that persons intrinsically enjoy experiences of affiliation. This unique, irreducible quality of fellow-feeling must guide all further analysis into the dynamics and ramifications of personal and social values.

Here we first note how deeply interrelated is the value of affiliation with the creation, conservation and increase of all the other values. Because persons are born dependent upon adults for health, for growth and for understanding, their opportunity for character development is affected by the willingness of other persons to discipline their own wants so that from the beginning the growing person can make his choices with freedom guided by insight. In a broader context, as we have noted, a person's search for truth is impeded by the unwillingness of others to allow the truth-seeker freely to pursue his investigations and then to publicize his conclusions. The quality of conversation, the development of science, art, industry, the family, church, state—these all depend in large degree on the course affiliation takes in the lives of persons. Indeed, so many of the values of life are created in, and enhanced by, mutual sharing and enjoyment that there is no need to belabor the importance of affiliation.

In our own day, however, we are in danger of forgetting that affiliation, including friendship and romantic love, can become sentimental unless it is dedicated to the realization of other values. The great seduction in the area of romantic love stems from the failure to realize that affection becomes shallow and insipid when it is not invested in pursuits that keep both persons growing. There is all the difference in the world between: "I like you," and "I love you." For two persons to be together is to be together not merely in space, not in body alone, but in the creation and mutual enjoyment of other values. And is it not a dominant fact of experience, for all of our pervasive blindness to it, that often the profoundest fellowship, creative of new dimensions in a relationship, is born of mutual sacifice, of loyalty in suffering?

I suggest, further, that one of the saddest phenomena in contemporary life stems from the failure to see that the interpretation of values and the sharing of values is critical to personalized sexual fulfillment. The sexual athletes who jump from bed to bed confident that their health values are being protected by the appropriate contraceptive and miracle medicines may well ask themselves whether the quality of their sexual gymnastics and even their orgasms is one that can be sustained when they care little or nothing for their partner's total ventures in value. Persons, married or unmarried, I have suggested elsewhere,[4] find meaning, growth, and creativity in their sexuality, to the extent that their commitment to each other goes beyond convenience, play and "release" of tension. It must involve dedication as well. What is being overlooked in "all you need to know about sex" is that persons need to feel cared about for themselves, that they cannot give of themselves if they feel that their meaning to another is largely as a segmental source of pleasure, however discreet. Rollo May,[5] speaking from his psychiatric experience, says that many of the patients he treats are no longer afraid of their bodies—they are afraid to care. And Erich Fromm, in a book read especially by students, has not been understood in his underlying theme: no one is emotionally mature who has not moved from: I need you, therefore, I love you! to: I love you, therefore I need you!

The evidence for such contentions, again, is not only in our loins but in the larger psycho-dynamics of our emotive needs and abilities. Sexual emotion is not a segment of our lives that can grow in meaning and express the creativity for which we yearn unless the values in it are joined to the rest of our ventures in value. Sex education for persons will go beyond information to the realization of the truth of what Freud himself ventured when asked what the conditions of health are: "Work and Love."

VI. VOCATION

The mention of work takes us to a consideration of the values persons find in work. For a person the quality of affiliation involved in his efforts to earn a living makes much of the difference between sharing in a common task and "making a buck." The job one has, the work one does "for a living," may well take its place alongside family experience as the arena in which most persons develop their personalities in association with others. A man's work and its value in a community may indeed be his economic and social capital; it may evoke admira-

[4] *Sex, Love and the Person* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).
[5] *Love and Will* (W. W. Norton and Co., 1961), Part I.

tion, respect and praise from others, and thus be a source of many social and economic values. It can, accordingly, support and express the values of health, truth, character and affiliation. What unemployment means to a person ranges all the way from fruitless idleness to feeling that he cannot make his own way in the community. The statistic "4½% unemployment" takes on poignant meaning when it is translated into value-deprivation for individual persons who are unemployed.

All the more important is to move from doing a job to realizing oneself in a *vocation.* A vocation gives direction to life in terms of jobs in an economic sense, instead of accepting the challenge of a larger task that gives meaning to their lives as a whole. When a job is seen as part of one's total living, for today and tomorrow, for oneself and others, the drudgery is still there but it can be acceptable as a person's share, along with the goods, of affiliative ventures.

Surely both social and educational policy cannot be geared mainly to preparing persons for the jobs that need to be filled. While the person must be free to select the job preparation he wishes, educational policy cannot be content with less than the provision of graded and diversified programs that will help the person to discover his competencies and the areas that bring him high qualitative satisfaction—and mainly because he feels that his own unique constellation of wants and abilities are best fulfilled therein. The fact is that too many people who "are making good money" are bored with life; they are mediocre as persons because their lives have lost the direction and deeper focus that a sense of vocation can give. On the other hand, many persons, especially in an economic world in which automation is spreading, will need to find their sense of vocation outside the purely economic sphere. Persons who do not feel fulfillment somewhere in their everyday concerns are likely to develop a spiritual vacuum—or a psychic disease that cannot be overcome by activities which give temporary relief only. At the same time, many persons do not feel degraded, however boring much of their work is, provided others appreciate them in other ways besides the financial; this is a lesson we learn when we consider that so many persons, mothers and fathers, military men, accept all sorts of dull routine once they feel their efforts count.

VII. AESTHETIC VALUE

Here we are already bordering on another realm of values that consists essentially not in "coping with life," but in expressing oneself creatively. I mean, of course, aesthetic values—and recreational values insofar as they involve aesthetic orientation.

By aesthetic value I mean the goal-directed experience of expression and appreciation undergone or "enjoyed" for its own sake.

This is the place to re-emphasize that the realms of value are not compartments of life but phases of experience that live together in the complex of personal existence. Even the most utilitarian pursuits can have their aesthetic moments or phases; the moral ventures of life can express and be enhanced by aesthetic meaning ("the good deed done gracefully"). However, while the setting aside of an hour for aesthetic experience is as ridiculous as setting aside an hour for moral experience or for worship, the fact remains that we find our lives richer because we can "take time out" to appreciate aesthetic performance and to express ourselves artistically.

Once more, our danger lies in thinking that art is something reserved for the museum and gallery. The friendly card, the open smile, the gracious "thank you" or "I'm sorry"—or the shape of a silver spoon, the form of a chair, the many adornments of the home, street, office and "the offices" and amenities of our interpersonal relations—these are the kinds of experiences that give much aesthetic glow and depth to human existence. Aesthetic experiences, in and outside "the arts," are not incidental luxuries that may be added casually to the main course of existence. The aesthetically sensitive person who enjoys and suffers dimensions of being, along with the other dimensions of life, finds quality not open to other human beings and feels the better for both. For he has learned to laugh and to cry as well as "to cope" with a sense of humor that puts the varied human lot in perspective.

For example, imagine what a human life becomes that is dead to the experience of song and music, that makes no response to drama and the visual arts, to whom nothing in nature is thrilling, to whom the comic and the tragic, the beautiful, the ugly and the sublime make no difference, and you have before you a human being who may sense, feel, and even think and be socially responsive—and yet know no resonance. At the same time, let a person give himself to the disciplines of aesthetic control in every area of life and he will find growth that cannot be measured in terms of physical, moral or intellectual strength alone.

We are aware once more of the plurality of value-experiences on the one hand, and on the other hand the network that binds them together in the person. In seeking the pattern of values, we have been scanning human experience for moments and movements that have been found highly satisfying; we have been impressed by the ways in which they express different facets of

personal being while, at the same time, creating problems of growth and harmony. If we can draw any conclusion at all from this brief outline, it is this: *The problem of life in the areas of value-experience is to learn how to orchestrate the values so that each may contribute to the whole without losing distinctiveness.*

VIII. THE SYMPHONY VS. THE SCALE OF VALUES

I find the expression "symphony of values" and their "orchestration" more meaningful than *scale of values* (with a higher and a lower end). Why? Because in relating any pattern to any individual life in which these values do interpenetrate, it is the development of different motifs or movements which must receive attention as they seek the life good to live from day to day. The questions are: Which orchestration leaves the way open to further realization of values as each life moves from infancy to old age? Which orchestration, as each life faces the opportunities and exigencies of its existence in physical and social environment, will least foreclose the possibilities for later *mutual* value-enhancement and support? The main contention is that the death of quality in living results when we adopt the attitude that "anything is all right once." This encourages a cheap democracy, or mobocracy of values. At the same time, the answer is not specialization in one area of values. Such concentrations as "intellectualism," "aestheticism" and "moralism" warn us of what can happen to warp life when a person sacrifices too many other value-considerations to high hopes of proficiency or "perfection" in one area.

Abstractly put, the problem is how to achieve optimum quality without sacrificing variety. Three things are certain: first, tension, conflict and challenge cannot be avoided in creating, conserving and increasing values. Second, as is also suggested by the notion of a symphony, at any one point in the development of a pattern, the problem is to keep the themes of value in a relationship that will be mutually enhancing. Phrases like "nothing too much," "creative counterpoise," "dialectic of values" are different ways of indicating that the human search for quality in value-experience always faces some concrete problem of selection for the sake of ultimate range and unity; risk is integral to the search, and "peace of mind" is inimical to growth.

Concretely put, the problem for any human being in his own life, and for the educator who would help others to find themselves, is to orchestrate value-experience in accordance with that individual's stage of development. Just as every personality is unique, so too will the specific ways in which values are realized

in a given personality be unique. We are not presenting, as it were, a fixed pattern of values which becomes a kind of harness to which one fits his personality. The task of self-education is the task of finding where one is, and how far one can go, in relation to the total human venture in value-realization.

IX. RELIGIOUS VALUES AND PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION

"He who has a why to live can bear almost any how," said Nietzsche. I have been arguing that the why to live is to be found in the dynamic relations among values that we discover in this kind of world, with our kind of potential. The mystery of life, if you will, is that this is the way quality of human value-experience is sustained. A philosophy of life does not solve the mystery; it seeks to corner it by seeing it as a whole, as William James said. It is man the thinker, man the seeker—for health, for truth, for creative control (character), for aesthetic meaning, for affiliation—it is this man who asks whether man is alone in his concern for value-realization. Is man's search for value in harmony with whatever the ultimate structure of the world is? More specifically: Is there a Being for whom man in his search for values is a value?

I wish to stress here that this philosophical question cannot be answered without an examination of another area of value-experience, the religious. The vitality and beliefs of any religion could dry up were they not freshened by the continuing experiences not only of religious "experts" like the mystics in every culture and nation, but also by the testimony of millions who are not religious seers or prophets. At the moment I care not how we finally interpret what I would call the experience of the holy. I soberly record the fact that those human beings who have experienced "the holy" have felt that this experience was at least as significant for them in their search for value as any other—indeed they have felt both challenged and supported by it. And they have reported that it gave them power such as no other value-experience has given them. Often, the inspiring theme for the orchestration of values has ultimately depended on the particular interpretation they have given to their experience of the holy.

Let me put this point another way. Man, in view of his religious experience, has been called a worshipping animal. What he has worshipped has become the source of unity and power in his life—his cosmic vocation. The object of worship has fascinated him, gripped him and claimed his allegiance. In its Name he has lived and died; in its Name he has been willing to sacrifice all

other values; in its Name he has been willing to extend himself unrelentingly in the search for truth, beauty and goodness, both for himself and others. In its Name—we must face this fact also—men have hurt themselves and persecuted and destroyed others.

If such a brief description is at all true, it follows that no search for a pattern of values can possibly disregard the experience of the holy and of worship. For the interpretation of the holy can destroy a symphony of values—or it can be its dominant, creative theme. No responsible educator, therefore, can minimize the importance of the search for, or neglect the task of interpreting, the meaning of religious experience. Not, at least, if he is interested in the dynamics of the orchestration of values. If at every stage in education there is concern for, appreciation of, and responsibility for, both the part and the whole of human experience, then education that discourages the experience of, and critique of, the religious experience, has lost its way and is simply truncated education. That education which is unwilling to recognize the human potential that we call, sometimes, a "sense of awe" is education that is willing to neglect an experience that sets the whole of life on fire—for good or evil.

It will be noted that I have not been speaking of religious cults and denominations. These have produced their prophets as well as persecuted and killed them. My concern is more far-reaching, especially in a day when religious and philosophical dogmatism of the right and of the left seems bent on spilling the wine that does not fit their bottles. I can only suggest that, in view of what William James properly called "the variety of religious experience," we recognize (as James himself did) that religious experience, the experience of the holy, does not come with a final specific label or doctrinaire set of beliefs attached. Thus, whatever one's own final conviction about the validity of a specific religious revelation or interpretation, any person within any religious tradition must be cognizant of the human disagreements in defining the faith by which men live. To be tolerant religiously is not to say that religions are "a private matter" not to be discussed, but to open the heart, ear and intellect to the perspective of another that is at odds with one's own faith.

This is another way of saying what I have urged about each realm of value-experience. Religious experience must not dictate to the other values of life but partake with them in defining what the worthwhile ventures in life are. Such religious sensitivity and conviction remain, after all, a testimony to the essential goodness of life, seen in terms of the structure of faith.

One thing all religions do: they keep man from "idolatrizing" either himself or any of his institutions; they make him aware that he lives by grace and is given much, both good and evil, that he does not deserve. Man has been tempted to treat God and the Universe as his servant, as a cosmic Santa Claus, or a cosmic Policeman, or a Cosmic insurance policy. But the profoundest religious leaders have yearned to be at one, at least in their purpose, with their God: "not my will but thine."

To be sure, many persons, unwilling to accept the conflicts and frustrations of life, try to flee from them; their God is merely their Refuge. But on almost any view of God, he is in some sense at work with his world; as Alfred North Whitehead says: he is "that tender care that nothing worth saving be lost." God saves us by giving us the dignity of belonging to the march of history and the whole of things, so that both the quality of life and the quality of dying are never escapes from what I have elsewhere tried to call creative insecurity.[6]

Professor Gordon W. Allport has expressed our situation in his discussion of the religious sentiment. He recognized the need for a unifying philosophy of life, but he also knew that an immature religious sentiment keeps a personality from growing and promotes rigidity. But this student of personality finds that a mature religious sentiment connects a person to "what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things" without damming up the main stream of personal experience by chaotic ecstasies. Indeed, because it is part of the individual's search for meaning, the mature religious sentiment will be more than "just emotional," more than "cold reason"; it will encourage the person not to allow his life to run off into little rivulets by confronting him with the demand that he take seriously the integrity of his values and their possible integration with an Ultimate Ground of Being. The mature religious personality will indeed know that, since he cannot know all, he must remain in uncertainty even as he "learns to act wholeheartedly even without absolute certainty."

A final note here: there can be no symphony of values, no patterning of ideals, for a person who is not willing to be at once attached and detached in his pursuit of values. On the ideal of personality presented here, the overriding sin is to pursue one realm of values as if it were the be-all and end-all of life. To be creative is to persist in the orchestrating of the value-experiences of life. Only by so doing will a person be both *re-*

[6] See Peter A. Bertocci, *Religion As Creative Insecurity* (out of print, but in process of being reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1973).

sponsive to the reaches of his own being and *responsible* for communion with the horizons of values in other lives.

X. REFLECTIVE OVERVIEW: A PERSONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE

The ideal of personality as an interpenetrating, creative organization of values, reflects concern that an ethical system express the dynamic possibilities of the varied dimensions, feelings and emotions of human nature as we understand them today. The orchestration of the (unfinished) symphony of values, as persons interact with each other in their total environment at any point in history, constitutes the art of living. In essence, the art of living involves the concrete selection of those values that mutually support and enhance each other at a given growth-point in individual social life.

What this means is that the symphony of values does not by itself spell out what particular value-experiences will ensure the greatest expression of the human potential. Two observations may be made about the task of determining the best possible orchestration of values. First, any particular set of personal habits or social customs must stand under the judgment of the symphony of values with a view to reaching a more inclusive and higher quality of human fulfillment. For example, customs regarding the treatment of women, the elderly, convicts and minority groups have been called into question on the ground that they hindered rather than fostered value-realization within these people as persons.

But it should be noted also that when we say: "Treat servicemen as persons and not merely as soldiers" we are in fact saying: "Realize that there are certain values within the range of their experience that may be being denied them without good reason." Again, noble and right as it is to say: "Treat persons as ends and not as means only," there is no illumination as to what this entails unless we consider the values which persons-in-community need. The symphony of values helps us to see what ends we need to pursue when we seek to follow the words: "love thy neighbor."

Second, the moment certain habits and customs are criticized with a view to a better orchestration of values, the evaluating persons enter into understandings, make rules, draw up contracts, legalize behavior and, to put it broadly, develop *codes of conduct.* That is, persons tend to *codify* their value-situations. These codes (of ethics) for lawyers, doctors, clerics, for certain business enterprises, are illustrations. The readers of this journal will be especially aware of the codes that govern so much of

military life. What must be emphasized here is that no code organizes all the values of life—personal and social. Any code, therefore, stands under the judgment of the values of life as a whole. Codes sometimes wear out, but when they conflict with each other they involve conflicts in the area of value-realization as a whole. The court of appeal will be the reasoned dynamics of the interpretation of values. All human codes, all human institutions, must come before the court of concern for the most inclusive and mutually enhancing organization of values.

The task of the chaplain is often at the borderline of conflicting *codes* which need careful re-examination. If anyone in the military is to be guided by the vision of excellence involved in the most inclusive and creative organization of values, it is the chaplain. But it is his insight, gathered from his actual experience of the values and codes involved in the military enterprise, that must guide him in providing the understanding, contracts, codes that will embody most adequately the fulfillment of persons in the course of their military experience.

ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND

Roger L. Shinn, Ph.D.

I come to you, at the invitation of the Chief of Chaplains, as an old soldier who has obeyed many commands and grumbled about quite a few; as a wartime company commander who has issued many commands, some effective and some futile; and as a scholar and teacher who for 25 years has worked in the field of social ethics, trying to learn what the processes of our society do to people.

I am aware of the many worlds of experience that meet here in this room. I am also aware that each of us individually is a meeting ground of differing worlds of experience. One of my students this past year impressed me with the way in which worlds can interact in one person. He was an officer in the United States Army, sensitive to the values and loyalties of the military world. He was a chaplain, an ordained clergyman, with commitments to his church and its faith. He was a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education, alert to the demands of the world of scholarship. And he was a black man, sharing the aspirations and anger of his racial group at this particular time in history. A rare and thoughtful human being, he thus found in himself these four worlds of experience—each with its prestige systems, its goals and its carefully cultivated symbols. The act that earned him status in one world could cost him status in another. He therefore had to ask himself: was he an authority figure or a rebel, a man ambitious to rise in an establishment or a challenger of all establishments? Because he was such a questioner, he was a better human being.

We here find our identities in many communities. We look for approval to varied reference groups. We laugh at different jokes, our spines tingle to diverse music, and we become angry over contrasting types of sacrilege. We may know the worlds of the military, of political leadership, of diplomacy, of business, of church and synagogue, of higher education, racial heritage, of sexual identification.

These worlds of experience are also worlds of discourse, with

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differing vocabularies. Bulls and bears on the prairies and in the forests are not the same as bulls and bears on Wall Street. Plumbers mean one thing in my kitchen, something else in national politics. Laundering has a clear meaning at home, another meaning in financial electoral campaigns. The word "gay" has quite different meanings in different communities. Long hair and a shaggy beard are a way of saying "I belong" in some worlds and "I don't belong and don't want to belong" in other worlds.

So communication is difficult at the interfaces between different worlds of discourse. What I say here today will come through differently to different hearers. But precisely at these interfaces communication may be rewarding. I welcome the opportunity to try. And I expect that the most challenging questions you ask will be the ones from which I learn most.

I.

The topic is "Ethical Aspects of the Exercise of Command." I begin by describing three paradoxes that I find in the nature of military command. They are there because life, seen honestly, is paradoxical. Conflicting values are part of human experience, and they pull us in opposing directions.

The first paradox comes out of the relation of command to the American ethos and experience. In some societies the basic idea of command raises no ethical problems, because people assume that God or nature made some people to command and others to obey. The American heritage, which is related to the biblical heritage, does not. At the birth of our country the Founding Fathers said: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights. . . ." Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and their co-signers knew that people are not equal in athletic ability, intelligence, or governmental skills. They meant that people are equal in human dignity, in basic rights and responsibilities.

If that is the case, what is the justification of command? Why should any human being have a moral right to command another human being? To claim such a right is to assume a heavy burden of proof.

Yet life often requires that we accept that burden of proof—nowhere more obviously than in combat situations. Events require decisions—prompt decisions. The success of a mission and human lives are at stake. There is no time to call an assembly and work toward a consensus, to appoint a committee that will report next year, to consult legal counsel, to develop an encounter group. Authority must be located—preferably in the best person,

certainly in a person trained and designated for that kind of decision-making.

So the exercise of command is justifiable. I suppose it is inherent in governmental processes, but especially conspicuous in military organizations. Yet it is ethically paradoxical, and it always requires the effort of justification.

I remember confronting the issue in my first week of basic training at Camp Wolters, Texas, in 1941. The platoon sergeant, a regular army man, was explaining to his fresh trainees the importance of obedience to orders. After all, he said, we were not exceptional in having to take orders. The NCO's took orders from the company officers, who took orders from battalion officers, and so on up the line to the Commanding General of the Division. And *he* took orders through a chain of command that went to the Chief of Staff in Washington. And *he* took orders from the Commander in Chief, the President. "And," the Sergeant wound up, "who do you suppose the Commander in Chief takes orders from? From you, the voters!" That, I found, was no comfort when I was ordered to do Sunday guard duty. But it was an important evidence of the weight our system of government attaches to mutual responsibility.

I thought about that responsibility often. I thought about it when I was commissioned and became a platoon leader. I rather liked the title of platoon *leader*. When I became a company *commander*, the designation was more perplexing. That anybody should be labeled a commander of other people raised all the perplexities that have haunted Western civilization from the times of the Hebrew prophets and Plato. I understood the necessity and the rationale. I hope I never forgot that the exercise of command involves an immense burden of responsibility and the possibilities of terrible abuse.

The second ethical perplexity of command has to do specifically with military command and the whole morality of war. War is, at best, a tragic necessity—an answer to aggression and oppression. It is, at worst, mankind's most cruel and destructive activity.

The message of the horrors of war and the good of peace comes not only from pacifists but from the heart of the military establishment. The Strategic Air Command has chosen the motto: "Peace is our profession." At the entrance to Carlisle Barracks, just under the words "Army War College," is the quotation, "Not to promote war, but to preserve peace," from "Elihu Root, Founder." [1] General Eisenhower, thinking about nuclear war as President of the United States, said in 1960: "War is now utterly

[1] For a photograph of the motto, see *Army*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1972), p. 56.

preposterous." [2] General Bradley described war as "a wretched debasement of all the thin pretensions of civilization." [3] General Patton, the most aggressive of all generals in World War II, nevertheless saw the moral and religious paradoxes of his role. On his first Sunday in Normandy, he has reported: "I went to a Catholic Field Mass where all of us were armed. As we knelt in the mud in the slight drizzle, we could distinctly hear the roar of the guns, and the whole sky was filled with airplanes on their missions of destruction . . . quite at variance with the teachings of the religion we were practicing." [4]

Like many of you, I have lived with this perplexity. I have believed it my conscientious duty to enter into war for the sake of justice and peace. In a world where hard ethical decisions involve conflicts of values, the military commander is not uniquely involved in such conflicts, but he is more openly involved than most people. And he stands peculiarly in a situation of temptation. Often the incentives that influence people generally—professional advancement, public acclaim, the approval of peers—are in his case related to achievement in war. The temptations are great to forget that the ultimate mission of the military is "not to promote war, but to preserve peace."

The third ethical paradox arises out of the cultural situation in which our generation lives—throughout most of the world and quite specifically in this nation. It is a confused cultural situation with deep disagreements about important human goals. We live in a world that is restive under authority, a world that distrusts concentrated power. An "anti-establishment" mood marks many societies and infiltrates even the most authoritarian societies—even, for example, the Soviet society. Centralized line organizations are not in style. Free-floating, charismatic authority rather than fixed hierarchical authority appeals to many people. Various groups—conspicuously youth, black people, women, poor people, those at the bottom of status ladders—are saying: "Nobody is going to tell us what to do. We want to make the decisions that affect our destiny."

Such claims sometimes have a rhetorical excess. Nobody makes all the decisions that affect his own destiny. All people live with some restraints, as well as some opportunities, defined by society. But some people have suffered many restraints and few opportunities. So it is not only a contemporary style but also a profound ethical demand that they be heard. The professional leaders of the "new army" are struggling with hard decisions

[2] Speech in Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 24, 1960. Text in *New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1960, p. 8.
[3] *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), p. 311.
[4] *War as I Knew It* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1966; first published by Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), p. 94.

these days: how can we increase the freedom and dignity of the soldier, what of the old style is "Mickey Mouse" and what is essential, what is the right combination of relaxed and permissive life styles with traditional disciplines?

Although nobody knows the answers for certain, the questions themselves are evidences of the perplexity our entire society faces. Although I live chiefly in, and share the values of, the world of higher education—where protest movements, freedom and spontaneity have been the recent vogue—I have some appreciation of the values of the military system. I think of two examples.

The first is the racial desegregation of the Army. Like the rest of American society, the Army waited too long to desegregate. But when it moved, it moved faster and more effectively than most social institutions—often shaming business, public schools and churches in the process. There is not the slightest doubt that the processes of command and discipline deserve much of the credit. The current racial problems in the armed services are evidence that command and discipline have limited effects and that the contagious diseases of our society cannot be banned from military life by edict. But the creative uses of command have served the purposes of democracy in the desegregation of the Army.

The second example comes from the experience of prisoners of war. I can barely imagine the ordeal of those soldiers and airmen who fought in what General Maxwell Taylor has called "the dirtiest, most unpleasant and least glorious war in our history," [5] who then suffered the painful physical and psychic experiences of imprisonment. It is to be expected that the wounds of those experiences will not quickly heal. Yet the strength of those men has impressed many people, even among those totally opposed to the war in which they fought. As *Newsweek* columnist Shana Alexander has put it, "these POW's now appear to us to embody precisely those moral qualities of honor, patriotism, discipline and purpose which many of us feel have largely disappeared from American life." [6] From my own far shorter and far less cruel experiences as a prisoner of war, I can testify to the values in the military system of command.

It is not the system for organizing a university, a congress or a church. The old system is not exactly the system for the future. The military system faces the perplexity of revising its methods to meet a changed cultural situation. And the whole culture faces the perplexity of relating some of its traditional values to the values getting more obvious expression today.

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[5] "Is an Army Career Still Worthwhile?" *Army*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 1973), p. 10.
[6] "Prisoners of Peace," *Newsweek*, Vol. LXXXI, No. 10 (March 5, 1973), p. 32.

II.

I have described three ethical perplexities or paradoxes that I see in the exercise of military command. These will be with us for a while to come. I expect no instant solutions, least of all at this meeting. But I think I see better and worse ways of meeting these perplexities. To understand them we must look at one curious characteristic of systems of command—to some extent of all systems of command, but most especially of command systems within a democratic society.

Put it this way: a command is compulsory, yet its effectiveness does not depend solely on compulsion. Take the first part of that statement. A command is by its very nature compulsory. It does not begin, "Everybody who feels like it, come along." A command is not a question, a suggestion, a hint, an invitation, an entreaty. It is a command, and there are penalties for noncompliance. But take the second part of the statement. The effectiveness of a command does not depend solely on compulsion. It depends also on morale. General Eisenhower in his *Crusade in Europe* wrote: "Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. . . . In any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting." [7] That tells a lot about the nature of command

Let me reminisce. During the last phases of pre-combat training for World War II, the Ninth Armored Division had a rule that no soldier should be separated from his weapon during training. The Commanding General inspected my company during a lunch break in the field. The company was deployed in such a way that I did not see the next event. One soldier had laid aside his rifle while filling his messkit, and the General told his aide to pick it up. That night I—not the soldier but I—had to report to Division Headquarters to recover the weapon and take a dressing down from the Commanding General. General John Leonard and I both came from Toledo, Ohio, but we never realized that until after the war, and in any case it would not have done me the slightest bit of good. I returned to the company with the rifle—and with my ears smarting. I had been told, once again, that it was my duty to *enforce* discipline. I understood the system. But, licking my wounds, I refreshed my memory again on the definition of discipline in the basic infantry field manual: "cheerful willing obedience" to the command of a superior. I knew that there was no discipline without enforcement, but I knew also that no force could compel that obedience be

[7] Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948, p. 210.

cheerful and willing. Effective command cannot simply be compelled; it must be evoked, won, earned.

I want to mention three ethical qualities of command that have something to do with the winning of discipline. The first is fairness. There must be no favoritism. Inevitably a commanding officer likes some of his subordinates better than others—and his wife likes some of their wives better than others. Probably he likes some of their wives better than others. That does not give him the right to assign the dangerous and unpleasant missions to those he likes least. His commands must be just; they may be strict, but they cannot be a matter of whim.

Most important of all, he avoids favoritism not only among his subordinates but also towards himself. He does not spare himself. He does not issue orders out of his emotional frustrations. He does not take delight in demonstrating his authority. He does not use others for the sake of his ambitions. He matches and seeks to surpass whatever loyalty he demands.

A second quality of command is courage. Everybody knows that soldiers are expected to have courage and that they expect their commanders to have courage. Not everyone thinks through the kinds of courage that life demands. The person conspicuous for one kind of courage may lack another.

A society like ours puts a high value on stability and the achievements of a civilization that has overcome some of the risks that are common to human life elsewhere. We don't expect tigers to pounce on us, bad weather to drive us to starvation, or enemy tribesmen to kill us. Since life is usually less precarious than in most past history, the demand for physical courage in danger is less frequent. It is therefore the more admirable when men who love life conquer their fears and risk their lives for comrades and a cause.

There is another kind of courage equally important—the moral courage to resist pressures and take a stand against immoral acts. Without pretending to know the details, I think that G. I. Ronald Ridenhour may have had it when he spilled the story of My Lai; or Airman Lonnie Franks when he disclosed General Lavelle's unauthorized bombings of North Vietnam; or Major Hal Knight when he told a Senator of the falsification of records of secret bombings of Cambodia. The man in a chain of command turns over some of his rights of judgment; he must act on the judgments of his superiors, even though his own judgment differs. What he cannot turn over to anybody else is his conscience and his integrity.

The last of the three qualities of command that I have chosen to emphasize, I can approach through an anecdote. A few days

after the cross-channel invasion of France in World War II, General Marshall flew across the ocean for a conference with General Eisenhower and General Bradley. We are told that they went over the military situation, as commanders do. Then, in a more relaxed way, they fell to talking about war and military leadership. They talked about historic commanders since Gideon. And they put up the question, what is the indispensable quality for the leader who must order other men to face death? The answer they agreed on came in one word provided by General Marshall. The word was *selflessness.*

That word is surprising. We expect of commanders a certain kind of self-assurance, a flair, an ability to dramatize themselves, a capacity to project a decisive image. What the three Generals meant, I suppose, was that the commander's concern for himself and his status must be less than his concern for the cause he upholds and the troops he commands, leads and serves. I suggest another word that may help to interpret their word. My word is *responsibility.*

Responsibility flows both upwards and downwards in the hierarchy. The commander has a responsibility to his superior officers, as they exercise their lawful duties. He has a responsibility to the Constitution of the United States. As Hal Knight told a Senator in testimony last week, "Sir, I didn't take an oath to support the military. I took an oath to support the Constitution." [8] It is a responsibility to international laws of war. It is, for many of us, a responsibility to God.

If responsibility—and particularly accountability—are most obviously upwards, moral responsibility also reaches downwards. The commander has a responsibility to those whom he commands. To forget it is to vitiate personal integrity and the ethical validity of the system. In Lord Acton's famous words, "All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." I don't know how often these days you hear the old slogan, RHIP. Rank has its privileges. Those privileges are deserved only if rank has its responsibilities. As the Bible puts it, "Everyone to whom much is given, of him will much be required; and of him to whom men commit much they will demand the more" (Luke 12:48).

There are commanders who understand that. In 1944 Ernie Pyle filed a story from the bruising Italian campaign. It was about the death of a company commander. As a company commander in training for battle, I read the story and aspired to

[8] Reported in *The New York Times*, July 22, 1973, Section 4, p. 3.

be the kind of troop commander that Ernie Pyle described. I want to read part of that dispatch.[9]

Captain [Henry T.] Waskow was a company commander in the Thirty-sixth Division . . . . He was very young, only in his middle twenties, but he carried in him a sincerity and a gentleness that made people want to be guided by him.

"After my father, he came next," a sergeant told me.

"He always looked after us," a soldier said. "He'd go to bat for us every time."

"I've never knowed him to do anything unfair," another said.

I was at the foot of the mule trail the night they brought Captain Waskow down. The moon was nearly full, and you could see far up the trail . . . . Dead men had been coming down the mountain all evening, lashed onto the backs of mules.

The Italian mule skinners were afraid to walk beside dead men, so Americans had to lead the mules down that night. Even the Americans were reluctant to unlash and lift off the bodies . . . , so an officer had to do it himself and ask others to help.

I don't know who that first one was. You feel small in the presence of dead men, and you don't ask silly questions. . . . They laid him on the ground in the shadow of the low stone wall beside the road. We left him there beside the road, that first one, and we all went back into the cowshed. . . . We talked soldier talk for an hour or more; the dead man lay all alone, outside in the shadow of the wall.

Then a soldier came into the cowshed and said there were some more bodies outside. We went out into the road. Four mules stood there in the moonlight. . . . The soldiers who led them stood there waiting.

"This one is Captain Waskow," one of them said quietly.

Two men unlashed his body from the mule and lifted it off and laid it in the shadow beside the stone wall. Other men took the other bodies off. Finally, there were five lying end to end in a long row. You don't cover up dead men in the combat zones. They just lie there in the shadows until somebody comes after them.

The unburdened mules moved off to their olive grove. The men in the road seemed reluctant to leave. They stood around, and gradually I could sense them moving, one by one, close to Captain Waskow's body. Not so much to look, I think, as to say something in finality to him, and to themselves. I stood close by and I could hear.

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[9] *Brave Men* (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1945), pp. 106–107.

One soldier came and looked down, and he said out loud, "God damn it!"

That's all he said, and then he walked away.

Another one came, and he said, "God damn it to hell anyway!" He looked down for a few last moments and then turned and left.

Another man came. I think he was an officer. It was hard to tell officers from men in the dim light, for everybody was bearded and grimy. The man looked down into the dead captain's face and then spoke directly to him, as though he were alive, "I'm sorry, old man."

Then a soldier came and stood beside the officer and bent over, and he too spoke to his dead captain, not in a whisper but awfully tenderly, and he said, "I sure am sorry, sir."

Then the first man squatted down, and he . . . took the captain's hand, and he sat there for a full five minutes holding the dead hand in his own and looking intently into the dead face. And he never uttered a sound all the time he sat there.

Finally he put the hand down. He reached over and gently straightened the points of the captain's shirt collar, and then he sort of rearranged the tattered edges of the uniform around the wound, and then he got up and walked away down the road in the moonlight, all alone.

The rest of us went back into the cowshed, leaving the five dead men lying in a line, end to end, in the shadow of the low stone wall. We lay down in the straw in the cowshed, and pretty soon we were all asleep.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I give you Captain Waskow as a soldier who understood the responsibilities of command.

A BRIEFLY ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ETHICS AND VALUES

This bibliography was prepared by the US Army Chaplain Board for use by the US Army Chaplain School in its function as co-sponsor of moral leadership programs in US Army Schools. This bibliography represents materials found useful by USACHB in preparation of Human Self-Development topics and in answering direct requests for guidance from the field. It is not exhaustive but will direct the user to other listings in the works themselves.

ARNDT, Hannah, *The Human Condition,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Good for discussion of the way majority rule can harm individuality and preclude the possibility of full humanity.

BAUMGARDT, David, *Bentham and the Ethics of Today,* Princeton, New Jersey: 1952.

An analysis of the writings of Jeremy Bentham which seeks to show that this utilitarian has been misunderstood and criticized for faults which were those of other utilitarians. Bentham is pictured as having tried to elevate the theory of morals to a higher level of exactness.

BERGSON, Henri, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1954 (paper).

Interesting for its analysis of Kant's categorical imperative and the relationship of instinct to intelligence. Also significant for a high appraisal of the importance of two kinds of natural societal obligations.

BERTOCCI, Peter A. and MILLARD, Richard M. *Personality and the Good,* New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963.

Psychological and ethical perspectives. Unique in its fusion of modern psychological insight into the personality and nature of man with classical philosophical ethics. Finally, the application of this psychological-philosophical expression of "The Good" to the problems of society, personal relationships and religion stamp this book as a "must" for all persons interested in both practical and theoretical expression of ethics.

BLANSHARD, Brand, *Reason and Goodness,* London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1966.

A thorough and yet highly readable text on most of the basic ethical problems. Because of its British origin it has those blessings of detailed annotations in the table of contents, footnotes on the pages of text and numbering of sections. Besides these mechanics it has insight into human nature hardly found anywhere else. Especially good for complete handling of competing theories held by most important ethical thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic.

BONHOEFFER, Dietrich, *Ethics.*

Basic reading not only for clergymen but anyone interested in fire-tested considerations of a theologian who rethought the ethical implication of Christianity. A concrete analysis of the meaning of Christ in the world and thus of an ethic which can stem from the impact of current incarnationalism.

BRIGHTMAN, Edgar S. *Moral Laws,* Chicago: Abington, 1933.

This old book has the advantage of setting out ethical principles in memorable form and bringing the various points of view to bear on those points.

BRONOWSKI, J. *Science and Human Values,* Rev. edition, New York: Harper and Row (Harper Torchbooks) 1965.

This book challenges the value judgment that "science has no ethical basis." This is done by showing that through a critical examination of the nature, origin, and methods of science, we may logically arrive at a conclusion that science is inevitably involved in questions of values, is inescapably committed to standards of right and wrong, and unavoidably moves toward social aims.

BUBER, Martin, *I And Thou,* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

Not a book on ethics, of course, but important in making a clear distinction in the matter of individualism and absorbtion in God or society. In other terms it provides a middle ground between extreme existentialism and prefabricated cosmological structures.

CAHN, Edmond, *The Moral Decision,* Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1966.

Based on particular legal cases, this book attempts to show moral decision making in the judicial system and to extrapolate from these to generalities. The judge who wrote it believes in an expanding concept of law and justice.

CONTEMPORARY MORAL ISSUES, 2nd Ed., ed. Harry K. Grivetz, Belmost, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969 (paper).

Essays by just about everyone you might want to hear from on the problems of the times. Great for getting quotes for that special paper when you don't have the time to do extensive research.

DAEDALUS, Spring, 1969, Ethical Aspects of Experimentation with Human Subjects.

The articles in this old issue are still timely. Of particular interest to chaplains is the article by Hans Jonas which says much which should have been said by clergymen on the issue.

De CHARDIN, Teilhard, *The Phenomenon of Man,* New York: Harpers, 1959.

Useful for the most extreme suggestions on the extent to which human responsibility in decision making can go.

EBY, Louise Saxe, *The Quest for the Moral Law,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.

One of the best surveys of ethics. Easily read. Its weakness lies in lack of consideration of the most current ideas.

EDWARDS, Paul, *The Logic of Moral Discourse,* New York: The Free Press, 1955,

Useful for a logical analysis of the Emotive Theory of Ethics.

ELLIOT, Hugh, *Human Character,* London: Longmans Green and Co., 1922.

If you can discover a copy of this old book you should read all the rest on this list to see whether or not you can steal it. It reads better than most newer ones and says some things the younger authors think is original.

FAGATHEY, Austin, S. J. *Right and Reason,* St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1972.

A magnificent textbook for Catholic college students which is informed, as so few ethic books are, by Catholic thinking. In all sections it is balanced by some opposing arguments.

FLETCHER, Joseph, *Situation Ethics,* Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1966.

A must reading for anyone expecting to contend with youth's interest in deciding on the basis of the immediate situation. It does not absolutely deny the use of higher law principles. It restricts the use of them.

GLASS, Bentley, *Science and Ethical Values,* Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of N.C. Press, 1965.

Contents similar to Bronowski volume above.

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An important collection of essays especially for the attempt to revive a platonic theory of justice and to establish levels of values apprehension found in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. It provides a useful partner to the Maslow hierarchy of needs.

GUSTAFSON, James M. *Christian Ethics and the Community,* Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1971.

This is a valuable book on how to do theological ethics. It points to a broad-guage use of the many ways of looking at ethical decisions including in a high order of priority the theological. Ethics retains its integrity as a separate discipline but can be informed by the transcendent.

HARTMANN, Nicoloi, *Ethics,* TMS, Stanton Coit, London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1932.

Especially good for correcting the tendency to extreme idealism. This material would have been enough to fully arm the instructor in Character Guidance days. Today it is still a good piece to pack around.

HAZLITT, Henry. *The Foundations of Morality,* Princeton, N.J. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964.

This is one of the most readable books in the field and one which, while covering the subject, doesn't hide the key points in verbal or logical complexity. Highly recommended for instructor use.

HENRY, Carl F. H. *Christian Personal Ethics,* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1957.

A scholarly, evangelical Christian look at the ethical discipline which complements other works on this list by bringing a deeper understanding of the supernatural to bear on human life and conditions.

JOHN STUART MILL'S ETHICAL WRITINGS, London: ed. J. B. Schneewind, Collier MacMillan LTD, 1965, (paper).

An extremely useful paperback since it not only includes the essay on Utilitarianism but relates Mill's thought to other thinkers by using Mill's own writings.

JORDAN, E. *The Good Life,* Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1949.

The author argues that feelings cannot be moral factors in individualistic approaches to ethics and that corporate considerations allow full development of human moral potential. Good for complete parcing of several personal virtues.

KNUDSON, Albert C. *The Principles of Christian Ethics,* New York: Abington-Cokesbury Press, 1953.

An older analysis of Christian ethics providing a large view of the subject from ancient history to past WW II. It does include theological greats such as Nygren, Brunner and Niebuhr and has the author's own contributions to ethical thought. Especially important is the discussion of the State and War. This discussion is a capitalized version of most of the arguments in favor of the just war theory.

LEISER, Burton M. *Custom, Law and Morality,* Garden City: N.Y. Doubleday Inc., 1969 (paper).

Since the three items in the title are continually confused and since each of them includes or is affected by the others, this essay is important. Starting with custom as the one factor which has been critically examined and defined the least, the book attempts to put the house in order and does a balanced job.

LOGSTRUP, Knud E. *The Ethical Demand,* TNS Theodor I. Jensen, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971.

A shower of cold water thrown on conventional wisdom about natural human motives. It shocks, then refreshes. Useful for distinguishing between individualism and estrangement, between unity and reduplication. Call to specific acts of responsibility without selfish regard.

MEANS, Richard L. *The Ethical Imperative,* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1970.

Particularly useful in the distinction between ethics and values and critical analysis of the manner in which scholars have tended to abstraction rather than dealing with and examining real people in real situations.

MOORE, G. E. *Ethics,* New York: Oxford U. Press, 1965.

A closely reasoned argument against a strictly utilitarian approach to ethics as well as an argument for a method of determining intrinsic value.

MORAL PRINCIPLES IN ACTION, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, New York: Harper Bros., 1952.

This is a selection and collection of essays by all the scholars at whose feet most people in the older generation would have chosen to sit for ethical guidance. They are arranged to form a study of morality with greater emphasis on the general and universal than on the individual and specific.

MORAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, ed. Paul Kurtz., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1969 (paper).

Essays presenting humanistic views of ethics by experts, some of whom we have already accepted as authorities for other reasons. Deals with most of the subjects clergymen approach from a theological position in an attempt to show how it can be done better without religious presuppositions.

MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE, ed. Wm. J. Nagle, Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1960.

Articles by Roman Catholic writers of importance. Because of its date, does not take into account problem of limited war posed by V.N. Good for complete bibliography.

NIEBUHR, H. Richard. *The Responsible Self,* New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

For the importance of this book, read the article by Dr. Weber in this issue.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals,* New York: Random House, 1969.

Nietzsche's view that "good" and "evil" are terms whose content is a fiction forced on societies by those who hold power should be understood by instructors in literate class sessions as well as in those where an anti-establishment element may be present.

NOWELL-SMITH, P. H., *Ethics,* Penguin Books, Baltimore MD 1954.

Emphasis is on logic and linguistics, the formation of propositions, questions and syllogisms and is interesting from the point of view of games people play with ethics.

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A purely humanistic view of ethics which uses psychological advances and makes the case for man without the supernatural as well as it can be done.

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A series of texts and lesson plans for use in value formation and support complemented by graphic and projection training aids with films for each subject. Based on an ecclectric theory of value determination and a variety of teaching methods. Emphasis is on group discussion.

RAMSEY, Paul, *Basic Christian Ethics*, Charles Scribners, New York, 1950.

A theory oriented analysis based on scripture which constructs a conservative formula. Does not engage in social application except in brief. Authoritative from the Reformed position.

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Part I (Book I) contains the most basic text in the argument about ethical values.

SIDGWICH, Henry, *The Methods of Ethics*, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1907 (paper).

The author's name is one of the seven or eight you will find in every ethics book. His work is a most complete argument for utilitarianism and serves as foil for those who oppose it in other writings.

SIDGWICH, Henry, *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 (paper).

By the above author and is based on notes for an article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. It's easier to read this way.

SMITH, M. Brewster, *Social Psychology and Human Values*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.

Although the terms "values" and "ethics" are not synonymous, ethics is subsumed under values as its most important division. Therefore ethical problems must be considered in any treatment of values in social psychology in such areas as human experimentation, problems of prejudice, and motivation and action in social protest. The subject matter of this book ought to be considered because it concretizes ethical theory at the level of everyday social concerns.

SMITH, T. V. and William DEBBINS. *Constructive Ethics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948.

A bouyantly written book on "how to make it" ethically which surveys the field, gleans the best and provides human breathing space between the rows of ethical formulas. Could be a good text for young people in nonacademic courses.

TARGET I–II–III, Robert L. Humphrey and Associates, Silver Spring, MD: American Institutes for Research, 1970.

Texts for use in value development and interpersonal relations with a strong emphasis on basic American values and concern for good relations with foreign nationals. Illustrated in cartoon form for easy reduplication.

TILLICH, Paul, *Morality and Beyond,* New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Contains a clear distinction between law as a structure inherent in creation and law as demand upon men to actualize the structure. Both these kinds of law place man in a predicament from which escape is found in meeting the categorical imperative with unconditional grace.

TOULMIN, Stephen Edelston, *The Place of Reason in Ethics,* London: Cambridge U. Press, 1968.

A thorough examination of the ethical arguments in terms of their logic which severely criticizes objectivism, subjectivism and imperativism. It plumps for functionalism and pragmatism.

VALUES AND THE FUTURE, ed. Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Reports and essays on current research in the area of values most valuable for the chapters on fundamental considerations of the problem and analysis of the idea of value change. Presents a good case for the possibility of research in theory but the results seem to prove the reverse.

VIVAS, Eliseo, *The Moral Life and the Ethical Life,* Chicago: The U. of Chicago Press, 1950.

Part I discusses and criticizes naturalistic moral philosophy in its several brands. Part II and III divide the discussion according to the book title. The moral life is that sort which is not affected by ultimates but is generally capable of being expressed in terms of laws. The ethical life does posit an absolute which puts him beyond laws.

WADDINGTON, C. H. *The Ethical Animal,* Chicago: U. Of Chicago Press, 1967.

Places emphasis on the question of what happens to the individual rather than on society in the moral decision.

WASSMER, Thomas A. *Christian Ethics for Today,* Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1969 (paper).

A college text which seeks to deal with situation ethics from a modern Roman Catholic position. Natural law and its permutations is discussed in depth in an attempt to show that the idea that the natural law deals only with generalities is not well founded.

WEBER, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* Tns. Talcott Parsons, New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958.

This is the classic book which has become one of the "scriptures" in sociology. Since so much of what is said about the effect of religion on ethics is colored by misconceptions concerning what Weber said, it should be read before you talk about it. The key matter is the importance he placed on values.

WILLIAMS, Bernard, *Morality, An Introduction to Ethics,* New York: Harper and Row, 1972 (paper).

Brief, easily read book which takes on the Amoralist on his terms and then provides an answer to other morally debilitating positions.

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Posits societal consciousness and urges caution in accepting the positivistic cosmology put forward by many social scientists.

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